

# POLITICAL INTERDEPENDENCE: EVIDENCE FROM MIGRANT VOTER TURNOUT IN 1,267 ELECTIONS WORLDWIDE\*

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Political interdependence has intensified due to globalization and significant worldwide events such as the COVID-19 pandemic and the 2008 financial crisis. Despite this, little is known about how political events in one country influence political behaviour in another. This paper documents political interdependence through the context of international migration, by investigating whether elections in countries where migrants reside affect turnout in their homeland elections. We assemble a novel dataset of migrant turnout in 1,267 elections across 43 origin countries and 217 destination countries from 2000-2019. Using the quasi-random timing of elections between countries, we find that migrant turnout in homeland elections that occur after elections in the country of residence increases by 7 pp relative to homeland elections that occur before. The findings are consistent with a model of salience where exposure to a host country election increases interest in the political process and drives migrants to participate in their homeland elections. Close electoral results rather than campaigns explain our findings. *JEL Codes:* D72, D83, F22

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## I. INTRODUCTION

Political interdependence has gained increasing significance in the current landscape due to globalization, widespread use of social media, and pivotal global events such as the COVID-19 pandemic and the 2008 financial crisis. The notion of political interdependence is broadly understood as situations where change in one setting influences the outcome in another (Franzese and Hays, 2008; Coate et al., 2015). Yet, we actually have very little evidence of the causal mechanisms of political interdependence at the level of polities and democratic processes, such as elections. Existing studies focus on the impact of particular elections (i.e. Trump election) or rare political events (i.e. Brexit) on political *attitudes* of regional or neighboring countries only (Malet and Walter, 2023; Costa-Font and Ljunge, 2023). This paper expands this discourse by looking beyond these low-probability events, demonstrating how national elections in one country impact political *behaviour* in another on a global scale.

We highlight the role of international migrants in connecting their countries of origin and residence through their electoral participation—an aspect notably absent in the extant literature on political interdependence. Two significant and emerging trends suggest the need to correct this shortcoming: there are around 280 million migrants worldwide, and over 130 countries have extended voting rights to citizens living abroad—with both figures expected to increase in the next decades (Fliess and Østergaard-Nielsen, 2021).

In this paper, we propose a unique setting that can address this gap. We exploit the phenomenon of transnational voting, where migrant voters who reside in one institutional and political environment (residence country) vote in another (origin country), to causally demonstrate the interconnectedness of national election processes. For this purpose, we study the impact of an election in a country of residence on migrants’ turnout. For example, we observe the voter turnout among Filipino migrants living in Spain, Denmark and Germany in Philippine elections.

We argue that the transnational context is ideal for two reasons. First, the date of elections in the country of residence can be considered independent from the date of the country of origin elections, and vice versa. Hence, the timing of the elections can be deemed as-good-as-random, solving the endogeneity problem of governments deciding to hold elections when conditions are

favorable. Second, the difference between migrants' residence and origin countries separates the institutional environment they are exposed to and the political setting they participate in. We can therefore do away with several endogenous factors usually marring studies that examine the relationship between institutions and turnout. In particular, electoral systems, voting laws and clientelistic practices in the host country are much less influential to turnout in homeland elections. Furthermore, some mechanisms that are applicable to the within-country context are not as relevant to our setting: voter fatigue can only matter when migrants can vote in both elections and local campaigns are generally not targeted towards migrant voters.

Data limitations have so far rendered the study of transnational turnout difficult. For this reason, we construct a novel dataset of Emigrant Voting Patterns (EVP), the first and largest data source on migrant turnout including 43 countries of origin (CoO), with voting statistics for each of their country of residence (CoR), and for national elections from 2000 to 2019. The size of the dataset allows us to use an identification strategy that depends on the number and variation of CoO-CoR pairs.

In this work, we provide causal evidence of political interdependence, measured as the effect of a CoR election on migrants' turnout in their CoO election. Specifically, our identification strategy exploits timing differentials between CoO and CoR elections. In some instances, CoO elections are held before the CoR election. In others, CoO elections are held after the CoR election. We argue that due to the transnational setting, whether a CoO election occurs before or after is quasi-random, so is the number of days to/from the CoR election. To bolster identification, we focus on short election windows: for example, our smallest sample considers a 30-day window, or including CoO elections that are at most 15 days before and after the CoR election.

Leveraging the different electoral calendars of the CoOs and CoRs, we find evidence of political interdependence: migrant turnout in CoO elections held after a CoR election is 7 percentage points higher than those held prior. This is both statistically and economically significant, given that the average turnout is around 57%. This increase in turnout wanes in time, and eventually dissipates at around 70 days after the CoR election. We also show that there is no pre-trend, i.e., turnout is stable for CoO elections held before the CoR election. In addition, we perform a battery of tests to ensure the robustness of our results: we (1) use

election windows with varying lengths, (2) add controls and country-specific fixed effects, (3) construct different versions of the sample, and (4) remove some countries. Reassuringly, our results are robust to all these checks. Finally, we conduct tests of the identification assumption. We perform placebo tests where we use the ‘original’ election date, which is what would have been followed if intervening events did not happen (e.g. early elections due to dissolution of parliaments, leader deaths, natural disasters, etc.). We find that results almost entirely lose statistical significance when the planned, and not the actual, date is used. Provided that our strategy depends on the exact day that migrants vote, allowing for postal voting or restricting same-day registration circumvents this. Comparing elections where voting by mail is allowed with elections where it is prohibited, we show that our results are mostly driven by countries that restrict the vote-by-mail method. Also, as expected, countries that require early registration do not see an increase in turnout.

Taken together, the findings above point to factors occurring *after* the CoR election in driving CoO turnout. In terms of mechanisms, our results provide empirical support to a model of salience where migrants observe the CoR election results, which serve as an impetus driving them to turn out. We show this through an event study of interest in CoO elections among migrants residing in the CoR, proxied by Google search trends in the CoR for CoO news organizations and the CoO electoral commission. We find that while interest in the CoO election is generally stable before the CoR election, there is a significant divergence among CoO elections occurring before and after the CoR election: interest in the homeland election increases for those whose CoO election happens after the CoR election, while it decreases for those whose CoO election happens before the CoR election. We take this as indirect evidence that the salience of the CoR election makes migrants more interested in their homeland election—but only when the CoR election precedes the CoO election. Next, we examine what aspect of electoral results is salient for migrants. Following literature on the impact of close elections on turnout (Bursztyn et al., 2023; Agranov et al., 2017), we document similar phenomena: close CoR elections have a larger impact on turnout, while CoR elections that are not competitive do not.

Importantly, we also show that other mechanisms are not consistent with our headline results. First, the absence of a pre-trend suggests that campaigns are unlikely to explain our findings. If

campaigns in the CoR can mobilise migrants, we should see a gradual increase in CoO turnout before the CoR election. However, this is not in line with what we observe in the data. Second, habit formation can be compatible with our results assuming that migrants can vote first in the CoR election, build the habit of voting, and eventually turn out in the CoO election. Using dual citizenship laws in both CoO and CoR to proxy for migrants who can vote in both elections, we find that this cannot rationalize our results. Third, we test for voter contagion, where higher turnout in the CoR leads to higher CoO turnout. The evidence we have rules this mechanism out. Finally, we explore whether the uncertainty, not salience, of close elections causes the increase in turnout. Considering elections where candidates or parties share similar political ideologies (hence minimizing uncertainty), we show that this does not explain our results.

Our findings primarily contribute to the literature on political interdependence. We advance previous work by assembling an original dataset that captures emigrant turnout worldwide. By doing so, we address two major shortcomings in existing work. For one, we move beyond studies that show how electoral events in one country affect the political *attitudes* of citizens residing in another country (Costa-Font and Ljunge, 2023). Instead, we demonstrate that political interdependence also influences political *behaviour*—turnout in our case. For another, our dataset enables us to consider over 1,000 election events around the world as opposed to one specific election in relation to a few countries abroad (Turnbull-Dugarte and Rama, 2022). This broader perspective enables us to offer insights into the mechanisms that underpin political interdependence in a more generalizable manner. In this context, we highlight the importance of analyzing international migration processes to better understand political interdependence.

This research also adds to a large empirical literature exploring the impact of election concurrence and election frequency on turnout (Boyd, 1989). The results of this literature remain ambiguous, and most studies are unable to deal sufficiently with the issue of endogeneity. The transnational context allows us to address these shortcomings and provide what we argue is robust causal evidence of timing on turnout. We show that in our setting, CoR elections induce salience among migrant voters, rather than the reverse effect of voter fatigue.

While most existing literature focuses on pre-election factors such as campaign mobilisation and past voting habits (Bekkouche et al., 2022; Pons, 2018; Fujiwara et al., 2016), our

study aligns more with the literature highlighting the impact of close election results on turnout (Bursztyn et al., 2023; Agranov et al., 2017). Our innovation rests on the use of the transnational context where overlapping political arenas emerge: close CoR elections influence CoO turnout—an important result that has not been documented thus far.

Finally, we contribute to the literature on transnational politics which lacks causal evidence for longstanding claims of how migrants connect their countries of residence and origin. Important questions on emigrant turnout have remained unanswered, largely due to the scarcity of data. With this new dataset, we hope to fill that gap in the literature. We also provide a credible identification strategy that establishes robust causal relationships. Differential election timings can be used to solve endogeneity issues that plague this literature, especially those arising from migrant selection.

Studying migrant turnout is crucial given its potentially significant electoral consequences. Recently, migrant votes have been decisive in various countries’ elections: Cape Verde, Hungary, Italy, New Zealand, Romania, Uruguay and the USA (Pogonyi, 2017; Turcu and Urbatsch, 2015; Gamlen, 2015; Moraes, 2009; Imai and King, 2004). With the expected growth in international migration, the political behaviour of migrants can only become more significant for political interdependence.

In what follows, in Section II, we discuss the existing literature on political interdependence and turnout. In Section III, we describe our data and provide summary statistics. In Section IV, we discuss the challenge of identifying a causal effect of the CoR election on CoO turnout. In Section V, we present our empirical results and conduct various robustness checks in Section VI. In Section VII, we discuss our proposed mechanism and provide evidence to disprove alternative explanations in Sections VIII and IX. Finally, Section X concludes.

## II. POLITICAL INTERDEPENDENCE: ELECTION TIMING, TRANSNATIONALISM AND TURNOUT

Political interdependence refers to contexts in which the outcome of interest in some units of analysis directly affect the outcome of another (Franzese and Hays, 2008; Coate et al., 2015). Ex-

isting studies have focused largely on policy and norms diffusion among political elites (Acharya, 2004; Elkink, 2011; Gilardi and Wasserfallen, 2019). More recent research point to cross-national political influence where the contagion or spillover of events in one setting leads to the cognitive activation of citizens in another (Malet, 2022). Examples include the impact of the US presidential election of Trump on attitudes concerning migration, globalization and the far-right in Europe (Costa-Font and Ljunge, 2023; Giani and Méon, 2021; Turnbull-Dugarte and Rama, 2022). In a similar vein, the Brexit negotiations served as a salient event that influenced EU-related preferences of voters in remaining EU-countries (Malet and Walter, 2023).

Our contribution to the literature on political interdependence is threefold. First, we extend the scope beyond low-probability events such as the Trump election or Brexit. Instead, we focus on general political events, specifically elections, which enables us to derive more generalizable results that encompass a broader spectrum of political dynamics on a global scale. Second, we introduce a novel perspective by emphasizing international migration as a mechanism for political interdependence. This dimension, largely unexplored in economic literature, offers a new lens through which to understand the intricate links between political events and their global repercussions. Third, our research documents political behaviour using the case of migrant turnout, extending the analysis beyond political attitudes. By focusing on voter participation, we provide a more comprehensive understanding of how political interdependence manifests not just in political perception, but more concretely in political behaviour.

### ***II.A. Election Timing and Frequency***

The importance of time in our empirical strategy connects our work with the literature on election timing and frequency in encouraging turnout. Studies of interdependence between elections focus on the impact of national electoral environments with simultaneous multi-level elections or more frequent elections *within one country*. The literature shows that turnout increases when multi-level elections are held on the same day, mainly due to the lower costs of going to the polling booth only once (Leininger et al., 2018; Smith, 2001). Voters may also get a higher sense of individual efficacy because they can vote twice and receive clearer information due to more intense campaigning and media attention (Schakel and Dandoy, 2014).

Frequent or closely adjacent elections could be thought to increase turnout in the most recent election through ‘behavioural determinants of sequential decision-making’ (Garmann, 2017). This literature argues that past turnout influences subsequent turnout through habit formation (Fujiwara et al., 2016; Kaplan et al., 2022), familiarity with the process (Sevi and Blais, 2022), or continued mobilisation and information provision through campaigning and media attention (Aker et al., 2017; Degan and Merlo, 2011; Arias et al., 2022; Grácio and Vicente, 2021; Giné and Mansuri, 2018). However, a counter position is that frequent elections produce voter fatigue. Voters may feel that they have been overwhelmed by the previous campaign, have already done their civic duty in the prior election and can just abstain from the next (Lijphart, 1997; Dettrey and Schwindt-Bayer, 2009; Kostelka et al., 2023).

A frequent criticism of these studies is endogeneity, such that the factors explaining the timing and frequency of elections are also those related to voter turnout. While the existing research argues for exogenous timing of elections, this is hardly achievable in national contexts when politicians generally have control over these choices. In the transnational context, it is more plausible that dates of CoR and CoO elections are independently set, and therefore, the timing between them, random. The benefit of the overlapping political environments is that many of the applicable mechanisms within a country do not automatically carry over to the transnational setting. First, concurrent CoO and CoR elections rarely happen, so the sunk cost mechanism of going to the polling booth once is not relevant. Second, only dual citizens are allowed to vote in both elections, so the relatively limited numbers of dual citizens may imply that habit formation is less significant in our scenario. Finally, the voter fatigue argument can be problematic to apply to our case: voters will be subjected to information from an electoral campaign in a different country (CoR) and despite this, may not feel that they have completed their civic duty in their own country (CoO).

## ***II.B. Transnational Turnout***

Emigrant homeland turnout connects the political and institutional environments in their countries of origin and residence. Ciornei and Østergaard-Nielsen (2020) highlight the role of political institutions in the CoR and point to a destination effect: emigrants coming from developing



democracies who reside in more democratic contexts are more likely to turn out. This finding prompts the question of the extent to which the access to democratic institutions in the CoR makes a difference for turnout in homeland elections. Micro-level studies of migrant turnout in both CoR and CoO have found that higher turnout in the CoR, indicating a stronger local integration, is accompanied by lower turnout in homeland elections (Chaudhary, 2018; Dev et al., 2021). Another finding is the role of information and mobilisation. Turnout in homeland elections is higher when there is a presence of homeland language media and active migrant associations in the CoR (Leal et al., 2012) or in situations with more intense transnational party campaigning (Burgess and Tyburski, 2020). Many of these studies are more descriptive and correlational in nature, and are unable to deal with endogeneity issues. We contribute to this literature on the empirical dimension by collecting a novel dataset with a sufficient sample and rich variation, which in turn allows us to employ a more credible identification strategy.

### *II.C. Determinants of Turnout*

While a large body of literature has provided evidence on voter turnout, there remains no clear consensus on its determinants (Cancela and Geys, 2016; Stockemer, 2017). Many studies have pointed to the importance of party systems and electoral rules such as compulsory voting laws (Hoffman et al., 2017; León, 2017; Gonzales et al., 2022). Another line of reasoning suggests that the salience of an election influences the decision of citizens to turn out on election day (Andersen et al., 2014). Other related work has focused on the electoral race itself and demonstrates that more competitive elections (Bursztyrn et al., 2023; Pons and Tricaud, 2018), and larger campaign budgets (Bekkouche et al., 2022) have a mobilising effect and increase the salience of an election. Determinants of turnout in the national sense may not be portable to the transnational context. For example, compulsory voting laws in the CoR may only be relevant to migrants insofar as local turnout spills over to migrant turnout via the contagion effect. Although campaigns have been shown to be effective in increasing turnout, when we consider migrants as ‘outsiders’ and in some cases unable to understand the local language, this result might not hold true in our setting. Instead, emigrants may rely on salient CoR election results to re-assess their evaluation of an imminent homeland election.

### III. DATA

This paper explores the impact of country of residence (CoR) elections on emigrant turnout in their country of origin (CoO) elections.<sup>1</sup> Therefore, the dependent variable of interest is the turnout of migrant voters coming from CoO, disaggregated by CoR. The unit of analysis is the CoO-CoR pair. As is standard in the voter turnout literature, we define turnout as the percent of registered voters who actually voted. The main independent variable is the differential timing between the CoR election and the CoO election. We examine whether the CoO election happens before or after the CoR election, and by how long (in days). For example, we consider the turnout of Filipino (CoO) migrants in Spain (CoR), and whether the Philippine election happens before or after the Spanish election.<sup>2</sup>

#### *III.A. Emigrant Voting Patterns (EVP) Dataset*

The Emigrant Voting Patterns (EVP) Dataset is a novel and original dataset that we purposefully collected to measure voting behaviours of migrants worldwide. As the first and most comprehensive dataset of its kind, EVP systematically captures the voting results of resident and non-resident citizens in national elections on a global level and disaggregates these results per CoR. The dataset covers 180 elections (legislative and presidential) in 43 CoOs in the world from 2000-2019, covering 218 CoRs across six continents. Figure I shows the global coverage of the dataset. The dataset includes a total of 10,605 observations at the required unit of analysis: CoO-CoR pair for each CoO election.

[Figure I]

The key feature of EVP is that it provides information on both the CoO and CoR levels. This particularity enables researchers to systematically analyse the relationship between emigrant voting patterns, and CoO- and CoR-specific variables. The data contains official election results from the CoOs' electoral commissions. Specifically, the database includes the number of registered voters, actual voters, total votes (valid and invalid), and votes per party or candidate—all

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<sup>1</sup>Other studies may interchange CoR with the host or destination country, and CoO with the home country. To fix terminologies, we use CoO and CoR for the rest of the paper.

<sup>2</sup>While it is possible for elections to be concurrent, this only happens for 40 observations in our dataset, and does not impact any of the subsequent results.

these disaggregated by CoR. As a constraint, we only collected data on the first round of elections when there are runoff elections or multiple rounds.

Countries included in the EVP dataset are those that have enfranchised their migrants and implemented overseas elections. In addition, we require CoR-level data, which not all countries collect. In Appendix A, we explain how we constructed the dataset, and present the elections that were included in the final EVP sample. Evidently, the resulting sample is a non-random selection: first, countries can enfranchise the non-resident citizens or not, and second, among countries that do, countries can collect and/or share the required data or not. In Table I, among countries that enfranchised migrants, we compare those that were included in our sample with those that were excluded.<sup>3</sup> We find that in general, variables are balanced across samples, except for immigration rate and GDP per capita, which are both higher in the excluded countries. Unsurprisingly, the Polity score is higher (i.e., more democratic) for countries included in the sample.

[Table I]

### ***III.B. National Elections Across Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA) Dataset***

Given that our main independent variable requires election dates for both CoO and CoR, and the EVP dataset only contains CoO elections, we complement this with the National Elections Across Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA) Dataset. This includes information on all national-level election events from 1945-2020 in over 200 countries, which covers presidential and legislative elections as well as constituent assemblies or specific referenda (Hyde and Marinov, 2021). The overlap with the EVP dataset makes NELDA ideal in constructing our independent variable for the entire sample.

### ***III.C. Other Datasets***

To analyse underlying mechanisms, we incorporate other datasets from various sources. Below we explain each dataset and the corresponding variables we use.

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<sup>3</sup>Reasons for exclusion are the following: unavailability of disaggregated data, unwillingness to share the data, or non-response to our request. In Table A.1, we also compare countries that enfranchised and did not enfranchise their non-resident citizens.

VARIETIES OF DEMOCRACY (V-DEM) DATASET | Apart from the date of the CoR elections, we are also interested in some characteristics of the results, such as the vote or seat shares of the winning and runner-up parties or candidates. The Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Dataset contains this information for over 160 countries in the same time frame (Coppedge et al., 2022). Given this more limited scope, we augment this through rigorous online research. Combining both sources, we construct the close election indicator for almost all CoR elections.

INSTITUTE FOR DEMOCRACY & ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE (IDEA) VOTER TURNOUT DATABASE | Similarly, turnout in CoR elections is also a potentially important determinant of migrant turnout. For this, we use the Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) Voter Turnout Database which has approximately the same coverage of countries over time (IDEA, 2021). To be consistent, we use the traditional measure of turnout using registered voters as the denominator, instead of the voting age population, which can understate the true parameter.

CLIMATE PREDICTION CENTER (CPC) PRECIPITATION DATASET | The standard instrument in the literature for voter turnout is rainfall. We obtain global daily precipitation levels at 0.5 degree latitude by 0.5 degree longitude grid from 2000-2020 to coincide with our sample. The CPC Global Unified Gauge-Based Analysis of Daily Precipitation data is provided by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Physical Sciences Laboratory (Chen et al., 2008; Xie et al., 2007). To create country level estimates, we merge this with shapefiles from IPUMS International.

GOOGLE TRENDS | An emerging source for data on public sentiment and interest is through online behaviour. To measure electoral interest, we scraped Google Trends data for searches of CoO-related keywords in all CoRs within a 60-day window of a CoR election. In particular, we searched for two sets of keywords: (i) the CoO electoral commission or organization in charge of elections, and (ii) the CoO news organizations. We use the Google-made ‘interest over time’ index as our proxy for public interest in CoO elections from individuals living in the CoR. The

data has two limitations: first, Google only started collecting data starting 2004; second, there are some countries whose electoral commissions or news organizations are not present in Google Trends despite being available in the generic search engine.

EXTRATERRITORIAL VOTING RIGHTS AND RESTRICTIONS (EVRR) DATASET | The political economy literature has noted the importance of registration laws and voting methods in influencing turnout. We utilise the EVRR Dataset which includes variables relating to migrant voting for around 195 countries between 1950 and 2020 (Wellman et al., 2023). In particular, we use two variables from this dataset: (1) method of voting and (2) registration requirements.

GLOBAL CITIZENSHIP OBSERVATORY (GLOBALCIT) CITIZENSHIP LAW DATASET | Dual citizenship laws determine who can vote in both CoO and CoR elections. We use the GLOBALCIT Dataset to proxy for migrants who can participate in both elections by combining two variables: whether the CoO allows for the acquisition of foreign citizenship and whether the CoR permits residence-based acquisition (Vink et al., 2023). The worldwide dyadic nature of the dataset, in addition to its comprehensive temporal coverage from 1960 to 2022, makes it ideal for our study.

LOCAL ELECTIONS DATASET | Although our focus is national-level elections, for comparison, we also look at local elections held nationwide. Our point of departure is the dataset by Kouba et al. (2021), but since they limit their sample to only 275 elections in 97 countries, we expand this dataset across space and time to match our data. The variable of interest is the date of local CoR elections, which will then be compared with the CoO election date and turnout.

ARMED CONFLICT LOCATION AND EVENT DATA (ACLED) PROJECT | Apart from elections, we also consider other political events such as conflicts and protests. We use the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) for its disaggregated data and wide coverage. While the dataset covers all our countries and the time period, the nature of conflict-related data implies that the sample skews more towards Latin American and African countries, with European and North American countries less likely to appear.

### *III.D. Summary Statistics*

The final dataset contains CoOs from all regions except for North America and South Asia while it includes almost all countries worldwide as CoRs.<sup>4</sup> Table II shows the distribution of CoOs and CoRs by region. Contrary to other studies, our dataset features a more balanced distribution of CoOs with less emphasis on EU member states and a higher proportion of countries belonging to Latin America and other regions. However, due to better data availability, half of observations are still from EU member states. The CoR distribution is more consistent with the real distribution of countries by region, although more than a quarter of observations have residence in EU member states, which is due to large waves of migration to the EU.

[Table II]

Because we require both CoO and CoR to hold elections (and have data on election dates), we effectively drop 459 observations (around 2.31%) from the sample, mostly coming from China, United Arab Emirates, Qatar and small island states. On average, there are 56 CoRs per CoO election, with a minimum of 1 and a maximum of 166.<sup>5</sup> Conversely, there are around 8 CoOs per CoR election, with a minimum of 1 and maximum of 34.<sup>6</sup>

[Table III]

There are 180 elections across 43 CoOs, and 1,267 elections across 185 CoRs for which we have election data, which combined yield 2,426 CoO-CoR pairs and 19,428 CoO-CoR observations. Further, Table III shows that each CoO-CoR pair has eight elections on average, with at least 1 and at most 22 elections .

[Table IV]

In terms of the key variables, we present their summary statistics in Table IV for each chosen window. The first column, ‘15 days’, shows that there are 161 CoO elections (or observations) 15

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<sup>4</sup>In Appendix B, we explain how we constructed our sample using the different data sources previously mentioned.

<sup>5</sup>Honduras only allows emigrants in the USA to vote, while the Philippines allows emigrants in 166 countries and territories to vote.

<sup>6</sup>Belgium is the most common CoR in our dataset. If we consider just CoO-CoR pairs (and not the elections), the typical CoR will have 13 CoOs, ranging from 1 to 40. USA is listed as a CoR for 40 out of 43 CoOs in the dataset.

days before the CoR elections and 129 CoO elections 15 days after. The average number of days from the CoR election is 7.22 before and 9.64 after. Moreover, CoO turnout is 60.62% after the CoR election, much higher than the CoO turnout before, which is 53.79%. The other columns can be read in the same way. With regard to sample size, initially, there are more observations to the left of the cutoff, but this difference eventually disappears. Figure D.2 visualises the McCrary density test, and shows that there is no significant difference in the number of CoO elections or observations around the cutoff. The reverse is true for the average number of days: the figure is lower before, but slowly catches up as the window is expanded. Most importantly, CoO turnout follows a similar trend, consistent with our expectations. For CoO elections after the CoR election, turnout starts out much higher than CoO elections before, but ultimately converges when a larger window is considered. Finally, CoR turnout is relatively stable at 66%.

The rich combination of CoOs and CoRs in the dataset allows us to study emigrant turnout in many parts of the world, and not just in a particular region (i.e., Europe). Having a sufficient number of country pairs ( $N$ ) and elections ( $T$ ) permits the analysis of how political behaviour is shaped by the interaction of factors in both CoOs and CoRs. In the following section, we outline our identification strategy and explain how our dataset is a necessary ingredient to employing such an empirical approach.

#### IV. IDENTIFICATION STRATEGY

Estimating the impact of CoR elections on the turnout of migrants in their CoO elections presents an empirical challenge. Turnout in CoO elections is driven by a host of factors that can simultaneously influence CoR elections and vice versa. Existing literature has shown that turnout is determined by campaign expenditures, election closeness, registration requirements, concurrent elections and the electoral system (Cancela and Geys, 2016; Blais, 2006). Taking advantage of the transnational context, we argue that some of these factors play a less significant role. For example, campaigns may be less effective: migrants might not be tuned in to the campaigns in the CoR and voter mobilisation abroad is also more costly and difficult in CoO elections. In addition, the endogeneity of concurrent elections is circumvented by the quasi-

random timing between CoO and CoR elections.

However, in the transnational setting, one particular variable—migrant (voter) selection—stands out as an important confounder. For example, results of CoR elections can be simultaneously determined with migrant selection such that migrants’ choice of destination is influenced by the sociopolitical environment. Likewise, the presence of migrants can affect CoR elections, especially when immigration is a salient electoral issue, as it has been in recent decades (Dustmann et al., 2018; Rozo and Vargas, 2021). Migrant selection into certain destination countries can therefore lead to the concentration of migrant types who may be more or less likely to vote (Bracco et al., 2018). This confounding effect renders establishing causality challenging.

In this case, the ideal experiment would be to randomly assign different CoRs into CoO elections, removing the endogenous choice of holding elections and balancing out factors such as the political environment and prevailing migrant sentiment. To mimic a randomised design, we exploit the varying electoral calendars in the CoR and CoO. The transnational context lends itself naturally to a quasi-experiment where the timing of CoR elections is arguably exogenous to CoO elections, and vice versa. Around the world, there are countries with irregular intervals in between elections, which when combined with countries with regular intervals, provides us with a natural experiment. In addition, even countries with regular elections for some reason can decide to move the election earlier or later than originally planned. Figure II shows the timing of CoO elections for two types of CoRs: Spain (which has a relatively irregular calendar) and the US (which has a regular 2- or 4-year interval). Here we see that CoO elections in some years may come before a CoR election, but may come after in other years. While this is more visible in Spain (or countries with irregular intervals), this remains evident in the US (or countries with regular intervals). Thus, in general, whether or not a CoO election occurs before or after a CoR election (and how many days before or after) is deemed almost random. This identification strategy allows us to skirt around selection issues and compare similar CoO-CoR pairs.

[Figure II]

For this to work, we require a significant number of CoR and CoO elections to produce rich enough variation to estimate causal relationships. The EVP dataset with its global coverage



and transnational nature allows for this. We have 180 CoO elections and 1,267 CoR elections, with a total of 19,428 CoO-CoR election pairs. For example, for Filipino migrants in Spain, we can measure the effect of Spanish legislative elections on migrant turnout in Philippine elections. We do the same for all CoO-CoR pairs, and with the proposed identification strategy, compare turnout in CoO elections that come after (‘treatment’) with those that come before (‘control’) CoR elections.

Formally, we estimate the following empirical model:

$$Turnout_{ort} = \alpha + \beta_1 Post_{ort} + \epsilon_{ort} \quad (1)$$

$$Turnout_{ort} = \alpha + \gamma_1 Post_{ort} + \gamma_2 Days_{ort} + \gamma_3 Post \times Days_{ort} + \epsilon_{ort} \quad (2)$$

$$\forall Days_{ort} \leq \{15, 30, 60, 90, 120, 150, 180, 360\}$$

where  $Turnout_{ort}$  is the turnout of migrant voters residing in CoR  $r$  for the CoO  $o$  election closest to the CoR election at year  $t$ ,  $Post_{ort}$  is whether the CoO election happens after (1) or before (0) the CoR election at year  $t$ , and  $Days_{ort}$  is the number of days to/from the closest CoR election (in absolute value). Robust standard errors are clustered at the level of the CoR.

The main coefficient of interest is  $\beta_1$ , which measures the impact on CoO turnout of being after the CoR election. While Equation 1 focuses solely on the extensive margin (i.e., whether the CoO election is before or after the CoR election), Equation 2 allows for analysis of the intensive margin (i.e. how far away the CoO election is to/from the CoR election). Hence, we are likewise interested in  $\gamma_3$ , which quantifies the duration effect. For both models, we limit our sample to observations within  $N$ -day windows. The smallest is a 30-day window, or 15 days before and 15 days after the CoR election, while the largest is a 720-day window, or one year before and one year after the CoR election. We present eight variations of  $N$ -day windows to see how our findings differ as a result of expanding the window and thus the sample.

## V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS

Figure III shows the event study plot of CoO turnout (in the  $y$ -axis) across months leading up to and moving away from the CoR election (in the  $x$ -axis). The coefficients are the mean turnout for all CoO elections that fall under each month. Graphical analysis provides suggestive evidence of a discrete jump from before the election to immediately after the election. In addition, only the first two months experience a significant increase, with the following months going back to baseline levels. Importantly, there is no evidence of pre-trends.

[Figure III]

[Table V]

Table V presents estimated coefficients from Equation 1. The dependent variable is the turnout of migrants living in CoR  $r$  in their own CoO  $o$  elections. Each column corresponds to the number of days before and after that is included in the sample. The main result is that turnout in CoO elections increases when they are held after the CoR election. We find that CoO turnout is around 4-7 percentage points higher when the election happens after the CoR election. This is an economically significant magnitude from a base of 56-57% representing a 7-12% increase. Unsurprisingly, we see that the coefficients decrease as the window is extended. This suggests that adding more observations far away from the cutoff adds ‘irrelevant’ elections which are less likely to be impacted by the CoR election.<sup>7</sup>

[Table VI]

We formally test this by estimating Equation 2. By interacting the intensive margin variable  $Days_{ort}$  with  $Post_{ort}$ , we capture the duration effect: whether the CoR election matters more to CoO elections that are closer than those that are farther away. In Table VI, we show that consistent with the earlier findings, while turnout increases after the CoR election ( $\gamma_1 > 0$ ), this decreases as one moves farther away from the CoR election ( $\gamma_3 < 0$ ). Note though that because

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<sup>7</sup>Here, one can see a variation of the classic bias-variance tradeoff. With a smaller window, the  $\beta_1$  is larger, but the variance is larger as well due to the small sample size. Enlarging the window can include more observations to diminish the variance, but the same observations may carry less informational content and there increase the bias (or in this case, decrease the coefficient). In this table, it seems that the ‘sweet spot’ lies somewhere between Columns 2 and 3, or 30 and 60 days.

the duration variable requires more variation, only in the last few columns when the sample is larger can we see significant results. For Column 5, we see that as before, turnout increases 8% after the CoR election, but this effect wanes: each day dampens turnout by 0.12% and it takes around 70 days to completely undo this effect. In other words, the CoR election has a more consequential impact on CoO elections that are within a smaller window. The effect diminishes and eventually dissipates for CoO elections far from the CoR election.<sup>8</sup>

Another takeaway from this is that compatible with the event study plot, there is no pre-election trend in CoO turnout ( $\gamma_2 = 0$ ).<sup>9</sup> That is, turnout in CoO elections that are held before the CoR elections is stable with respect to their distance in time. This, combined with previous results, suggests that the main mechanism for migrant turnout originates *post*-election, and *not pre*-election, and this effect tapers off with the passing of time. Before exploring the potential mechanisms underlying our findings, we discuss robustness of our results in the following section.

## VI. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS

In this section, we conduct various robustness checks of our main finding. We proceed in three steps. First, given that the identification strategy relies heavily on the timing assumption, we provide various tests related to the choice of windows, adding time fixed effects, exploring the regularity of election calendars and the initial sampling decision. Second, we consider the spatial dimension by investigating whether any of the countries are driving our results. Finally, we perform some sanity checks to see whether our data produces sensible results.

### VI.A. Flexible Day Window

Figure IV shows how our coefficient estimates on  $Post_{ort}$  vary with the chosen value of the window. For the initial range of values, our estimates are relatively stable and remain statistically significant.<sup>10</sup> As expected, we can see a steady decline in the point estimates, with the

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<sup>8</sup>In Column 1, the coefficient on the interaction is positive. This is because within the short window, adding more days (and therefore more elections) still increases turnout.

<sup>9</sup>In Column 8, we do see a significant positive coefficient, which goes against the expected pre-trend of CoO turnout increasing leading up to the CoR election.

<sup>10</sup>For the first week, the coefficient is not significant and noisy, which is natural given the small sample size.

significance vanishing past the 90-day mark. While our earlier tables presented estimates using only select windows, this exercise proves that for all other values within the first quarter of the election, our results continue to hold.

[Figure IV]

### ***VI.B. Adding Time Fixed Effects***

Given the importance of time in the identification, we test for robustness of our results with respect to time-related fixed effects. We add a combination of fixed effects: day-of-week, month and year of the CoO election, CoR election, or both. Table VII shows that for most specifications, the results remain statistically significant. When considering a longer window, the specification including year fixed effects regains statistical significance.

[Table VII]

### ***VI.C. Regularity of Elections***

Closely related to the electoral calendar, we test whether elections that have the same intervals are driving the results that we see. For example, both the US and Colombia have a four year gap between presidential elections. This undermines our identification strategy since it is not the timing *per se* that matters, but perhaps some factor inherent to the CoO-CoR pair. Below in Table VIII, we find that the main coefficient remains significant, and the interaction between  $Post_{ort}$  and the  $Interval_{ort}$  variable, which is an indicator for whether the CoO and CoR elections share the same gap, is not statistically significant. A more general test is to compare CoO-CoR pairs that have regular elections versus those with irregular elections. Again, our results remain robust to these comparisons, and therefore corroborate the soundness of our identification strategy.

[Table VIII]

#### *VI.D. Reconstructing the Sample*

As mentioned in the section on sample construction, some CoO presidential and legislative elections occur on the same day. Usually, turnout numbers would be similar given that these are same day elections and simply require filling out one ballot with more choices to be made or in other cases, separate ballots. Hence, one could argue that this method ‘double-counts’ these elections. To address this concern, for CoO elections occurring on the same day, we either drop all presidential or all legislative elections. Table B.1 shows that results are robust to removing either type of election.

Another sampling decision we made relates to the merging of the EVP and NELDA datasets. In our baseline model, we merge the CoO election in EVP with the two closest CoR elections in the NELDA dataset. In Table B.2, we find that even matching with just the closest CoR election (either before or after, but not both) yields the same results.

Finally, we merged just the first round of CoR elections from NELDA. The alternative would be to match EVP also with succeeding election rounds available in the NELDA dataset. Although this does not increase the sample size, it can diversify the match by merging with runoff or higher rounds of elections. As before, the results remain stable, and are reported in Table B.3.

#### *VI.E. Adding Controls*

In order to incorporate CoO-CoR specific factors, we control for the absolute value difference of logged GDP, corruption index and trade volumes between the CoO and CoR, and the geographic distance between the two countries. Adding these controls does not significantly change our results (see Table IX). A more general but stringent way of controlling for CoO and CoR specific factors is by adding CoO and CoR fixed effects. Results are robust to the inclusion of CoR fixed effects, but not so with CoO fixed effects (see Tables C.1, C.2 and C.3). Including both simultaneously requires a greater degree of variation, which larger sample sizes can provide. Unsurprisingly, therefore, results become significant when considering more extended windows.

[Table IX]

### ***VI.F. Removing Countries***

Another robustness check is to test whether results are stable with respect to the removal of certain countries from the sample. We do this by removing CoOs and CoRs one by one, and plot the main coefficient in Figure V. Results are robust even when discarding these countries. The only coefficient that loses significance is when Brazil as a CoO is dropped, and this is mostly due to the number of observations and resulting sample size. Widening the window prevents this issue.

[Figure V]

### ***VI.G. Actual vs. Planned Dates***

In some parts of the world, election dates are not fixed and are decided by the incumbent government. Hence, the *actual* election date may deviate from the date it was initially *planned* to happen. Several factors may lead to this discrepancy: deaths of leaders, snap elections due to coalitions breaking down, natural disasters, health risks, budget constraints and more. We perform a placebo test that uses the ‘original’ date, that which would have been followed if these events had not occurred.<sup>11</sup> Figure VI shows that while the effect of on-time CoR elections remains fairly significant, that of early or delayed elections is non-existent. This reinforces our identification strategy and shows the importance of actual, and not planned, CoR elections on CoO turnout.

[Figure VI]

### ***VI.H. Voting by Mail***

In this day and age, various countries allow for different modes of voting to encourage turnout. In particular, voting by mail can increase emigrants’ likelihood of voting. However, this presents a challenge for our identification strategy given that postal voting complicates the actual timing of voter turnout. Most countries that allow for voting by mail also give an extended period

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<sup>11</sup>We conduct rigorous online research to determine the exact date. If no sources are available, we use the typical term length of the parliament or presidency to estimate the date.

for voting—ranging from at least a week to more than a month (Wellman et al., 2023). This implies that migrants may have voted much earlier than the actual date of the CoO election, and therefore, the results are confounding other effects. If so, then our original findings provide a lower bound for the true parameter. Table X presents results that confirm our earlier speculation. In elections where postal voting is allowed, the effect of timing on turnout is completely reversed. The main caveat of this result is that CoOs that allow voting by mail can be significantly different from those that prohibit such method of voting.<sup>12</sup> However, closer inspection of the  $Post \times Mail_{ort}$  coefficient suggests a downward trend, which can also indicate that mail-in voting is more impactful to turnout when a smaller window is considered.

[Table X]

### ***VI.I. Laws on Registration***

Existing literature has found that more restrictive registration laws decrease turnout. Because timing is central to our finding, we explore whether stricter laws (i.e., requiring pre-election day registration) also lower emigrant voter turnout. This is even more stark in our setting because the timing of the CoR election can be impactful to non-registered voters only if they have enough time to register. In Table XI, we compare countries that require early registration with those that allow same-day registration. We find that consistent with literature, requiring early registration cancels out the gains in turnout. The main difference between this and the earlier result is the lag for the coefficient on the interaction, which is significant in later windows. This makes sense considering the fact that the decision to register precedes that of voting. Again, similar caveats apply with respect to potential CoO selection in registration laws.

[Table XI]

### ***VI.J. Alternative Identification: RDD***

After showing robustness to different types of specifications, we test whether another identification strategy can also be employed in our setting. Naturally, the ‘event study’ style of the

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<sup>12</sup>If we take the coefficient on  $Mail_{ot}$  seriously, this seems to suggest that CoOs permit mail-in voting because their turnout numbers are lower.

chronological CoO and CoR elections can also be analysed using the regression discontinuity design where the cutoff is the date of the CoR election, and the forcing variable is the number of days to/from it. Appendix D presents the RD plot and tables. Formally, we estimate the following regression:

$$\begin{aligned} Turnout_{ort} = \alpha + \beta Post_{ort} + f(Days_{ort}) + g(Post_{ort}, Days_{ort}) + \epsilon_{ort} \\ \forall \{o, r\} \text{ s.t. } Days_{ort} \in [-h, h] \end{aligned} \quad (3)$$

where variables are defined as before, and  $f(\cdot)$  and  $g(\cdot)$  are quadratic and cubic functions of the running variable (i.e., number of days from the CoR election). The optimal bandwidth value  $h$  is given by the bandwidth selection procedures used: Calonico et al. (2014) and Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). Robust standard errors are clustered at the level of the CoR.

Although Figure D.1 does not clearly show a discrete jump, estimates from Table D.1 are quite significant, considering the full sample or the sample excluding mail voting. Note that our original identification strategy can be thought of as a RDD using either a linear function of the running variable or none at all, and a pre-selected bandwidth value (i.e., the  $N$ -day windows). This exercise shows that the results are still robust to another identification strategy that uses a more flexible functional form and an optimal bandwidth.

## VII. PROPOSED MECHANISM

### VII.A. Election Results and Public Interest

The main findings point to mechanisms that occur *after* the election. To provide evidence of the relative salience of post-election variables and their influence on public interest, we scrape Google Trends data for searches of CoO-related keywords in all CoRs within a 60-day window around the CoR election. In particular, we examine how migrants in the CoR search for the following CoO-related keywords: (i) the top news organizations in the CoO, and (ii) the electoral commission or organization in charge of holding elections in the CoO. Using the example of the Philippines as the CoO, we use the following search words: (i) *Commission on Elections* as the main electoral commission, and (ii) the following major news organizations: *Philippine Daily*



*Inquirer*, *Manila Standard*, *Manila Bulletin*, *The Philippine Star* and *The Manila Times* in all CoRs where Philippine elections are held and where the data exists.<sup>13</sup> This is our proxy for migrant interest in their homeland election. For this to work, we assume the following: (i) these searches are mostly done by CoO migrants in CoR and not other CoR residents, and (ii) searching for the CoO electoral commission and news organizations are reflective of interest in CoO elections. To defend the first assumption, we argue that CoR residents are unlikely to search for a CoO’s electoral commission, nor the CoO news organizations especially since most of these are in the local language. Supporting the second assumption, we show empirical evidence in Figure E.1 that searches for both keywords increase around the CoO election day, suggesting that people indeed learn about the CoO election through these channels.

Given the richness of online data, we are able to perform a day-by-day event study analysis to support our conjecture. Figure VII plots the daily coefficient of the interest index, separately for CoO elections after (blue) and before (gray) the CoR election. Note that owing to the empirical strategy, the same CoO election can come before a CoR election and after another CoR election. For example, the 2016 Philippine election (May) comes before the Bulgarian election (November), but after the Portuguese election (January). The idea behind separating these two groups is to echo our empirical strategy: CoO elections occurring after CoR elections are the treatment group, i.e. the CoR elections have a potential impact on the CoO elections, while CoO elections before CoR elections are part of the control group.

[Figure VII]

Several observations can be gleaned from the figure. First, the pre-election period is fairly stable and similar for both groups—CoO elections before (gray) and after (blue) the CoR elections, implying similar levels of interest. Second, the index diverges after the CoR election, with the interest increasing for searches among people whose CoO election occurs after the CoR election, compared to a decreasing trend for those whose CoO election happens before the CoR election. Not only is the difference statistically significant, the magnitude is also sizeable. If the CoR election did not impact people’s interest, we would expect both trends to move in the same direction.

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<sup>13</sup>The exact list of keywords scraped in Google Trends is available in Appendix E.

We formalize these observations in Tables XII and XIII. Each column represents a specification with different sets of fixed effects. Time fixed effects include the day of the week, month and year of the actual date and both the CoO and CoR elections. While country fixed effects include CoO and CoR dummies (e.g. Philippines and Spain), election fixed effects are more specific and incorporate CoO election and CoR election indicators (e.g. 2016 and 2019 Philippine and Spanish elections). Finally, we include a specification that subsumes all the fixed effects.

[Table XII]

[Table XIII]

In both tables, we see that the coefficient for post election is negative: this means that for the control group (CoO elections before CoR elections), the interest index is lower after the CoR election than before it. This could reflect the idea that interest in a particular subject decreases over time. Second, the coefficient for the treatment group (CoO elections after CoR elections) is negative: in contrast to the control group, the treatment group has lower interest on average. Finally, the coefficient for the interaction is positive: after the CoR election, the interest among treatment group diverges from the control group, with the former having a significantly higher level of interest than the latter. Results remain robust even with the inclusion of all fixed effects. Note that by including election fixed effects, the analysis can make comparisons of the same CoO election occurring before and after different CoR elections.

If these trends are believed to be fairly accurate representations of public interest, then the results presented here align well with the story we previously put forward.<sup>14</sup> First, the Google pre-election interest trend broadly mirrors the EVP pre-election turnout trend. Second, the post-election jump in turnout can be rationalised by the Google Trend surge in interest after the election. Importantly, this uptick in interest is only true for the CoO elections that occur after, not before, the CoR election.

Taking stock of these observations, our initial findings using the EVP dataset highlight the disproportionate role of post-election factors in explaining the increase in turnout. The evidence

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<sup>14</sup>Note however the difference between the frequency of the data. The EVP data, while comprehensive, is not sufficient for doing a day-by-day analysis of election timing and turnout. For example, the 60-day window for EVP contains 525 observations, while the same window for Google Trends contains around 30,000 observations.

above supports this, and points to election results as the principal factor that indeed is most salient for the public.

### ***VII.B. Close Elections***

What particular feature of election results is salient to migrants? Consistent with existing literature, we focus on the closeness of the CoR election as a possible driver of turnout (Bursztyn et al., 2023; Agranov et al., 2017). To measure this, we compute for the difference in vote or seat shares between the largest and second largest party or candidate that received votes or seats. Then we construct an indicator for close elections when the vote share difference is below the median. Table XIV provides empirical support for this assertion: CoR elections that are close have a significantly larger impact on CoO turnout, while less competitive CoR elections do not have any impact on CoO turnout.

[Table XIV]

Overall, we have demonstrated that post-election factors—election results—play a central role in explaining transnational turnout. In the following section, we show that contrary to existing evidence using national contexts, pre-election and day-of-election factors—such as campaigns and CoR turnout—do not seem to explain turnout phenomena in our setting.

## **VIII. ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS**

### ***VIII.A. Campaigns***

Literature on mobilisation has pointed to the importance of campaigns in drumming up support for candidates and parties, which then leads to an increase in turnout (Bekkouche et al., 2022).<sup>15</sup> With this model in mind, the prediction is that CoO turnout should rise even before the CoR election, when the campaign period begins. In addition, the increase in CoO turnout should be larger leading up to the CoR election given that campaign and mobilisation efforts heighten the closer it is to an election. While we do not have actual data on campaigns, our results from

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<sup>15</sup>However, the literature does not reach a consensus as some studies have found that outreach or political discussions do not increase turnout (Pons, 2018; Fujiwara and Wantchekon, 2013)

Table VI and Figure III do not seem to support this story. Given that there is no evident build up in turnout pre-election, a campaign mechanism cannot be driving our results. In contrast to existing literature on national settings, the CoR campaign does not seem to provide useful information to and evoke the voting behaviour of migrants, who are most likely excluded from these efforts and are seen as outsiders, especially when they do not possess the right to vote. A complementary explanation is that migrants may not understand the local language and hence are not tuned in to campaigns which are targeted mostly towards locals and citizens. We test this assertion in Table XV, where we include language similarity, i.e. whether the CoO and CoR share the same official language, as an interaction variable. Results show that having the same language does not necessarily increase turnout; if any, it has a depressing effect. This rules out a potential role for campaigns—through language similarity—in mobilizing migrant voters to turn out.

[Table XV]

### ***VIII.B. Concurrent Elections***

Research that focuses on timing of elections within a country points to the concurrence of different levels or orders of elections in increasing turnout (Boyd, 1989). For example, when local elections are held on the same day as national elections, turnout rises (Kouba et al., 2021). In the transnational context, this may be different for two reasons. First, CoO and CoR elections rarely occur on the same day—we record only 40 instances of this happening, or 0.26% of our sample. Second, unless migrants are also citizens of the CoR, we consider different voters for the CoO elections (migrants) and CoR elections (locals/citizens). To address the first concern, we exclude observations with concurrent CoO and CoR elections. Table XVI presents evidence that in the transnational setting, concurrent elections do not play a significant role in explaining the growth in turnout.<sup>16</sup> We discuss the second concern together with the succeeding mechanism.

[Table XVI]

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<sup>16</sup>Alternatively, we also redefine the *Post<sub>ort</sub>* variable to include concurrent elections in the ‘treated’ group. This again does not change our results.

Another way to think about concurrence is in the traditional sense of having various elections at different levels occurring on the same day. Given that previous research has shown this to augment turnout, we verify whether this is true in our case. We test this by comparing CoR national elections with another concurrent CoR national or local election (e.g. two national elections or a national and a local election simultaneously), with CoR national elections that are held on their own. Table XVII presents results that show no significant impacts of concurrence of CoR elections on CoO turnout. Perhaps, this implies that there is a limit to the salience factor of elections, and that more is not necessarily better.

[Table XVII]

### ***VIII.C. Habit Formation***

Another potential mechanism for the increase in CoO turnout is habit formation (Fujiwara et al., 2016). In particular, previous acts of voting can raise the likelihood of voting in succeeding elections. Consistent with this strand in the literature, our results can be rationalised by individuals who have voted in the CoR election, have picked up the habit of voting, and therefore will also vote in the upcoming CoO election. However, existing laws only permit dual citizens of both countries to vote for national elections.<sup>17</sup> Given the lack of dual citizenship data, we proxy this by using citizenship and naturalisation laws from CoOs and CoRs, and see whether both allow dual citizenship (Vink et al., 2023). In such cases, the CoO-CoR pair that grants dual citizenship should record higher turnout rates. This also addresses the second concern we outlined above regarding concurrent elections. We confirm in Table XVIII that turnout is not necessarily higher in CoO-CoR pairs that grant dual citizenship, which we take as suggestive evidence that habit formation is not a principal driving force behind our results.

[Table XVIII]

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<sup>17</sup>While some countries allow resident non-citizens to vote in local elections, to this day, there does not seem to be any country that grants this right in national elections.

#### ***VIII.D. Contagion Effect***

While habit formation focuses on the act of voting across time, the contagion effect centers on voting behaviours across space and individuals. When voters are surrounded by others who have expressed voting intentions or have actually voted, this can lead them to turn out as well (Finan et al., 2021; Dellavigna et al., 2016; Funk, 2010). In the transnational scenario, the analog would be that when migrants see CoR citizens turn out in large numbers, this might encourage them to also vote. We illustrate this formally in Table XIX by testing whether turnout in CoO elections occurring after CoR elections is higher in CoRs with higher turnout. The results do not corroborate this mechanism, implying that higher CoR turnout is not a significant driver of increased CoO turnout.

[Table XIX]

Alternatively, we follow the use of rainfall on the day of the CoR election to proxy for CoR turnout. To model excessive precipitation, we use the 75<sup>th</sup> percentile as the cutoff. In Table XX, we see that there is very weak evidence that higher rainfall (and therefore lower CoR turnout) is linked to lower CoO turnout as well. However, when we use rainfall as an instrument for CoR turnout, the results are not statistically significant. Overall, we take this as proof that the role of CoR turnout on CoO turnout is minimal at best.

[Table XX]

#### ***VIII.E. Uncertainty***

So far, the mechanisms we have dismissed are factors that occur *before* or *during* the election: previous voting behaviour, the campaign period, and on-the-day turnout. However, an alternative explanation to our findings is that uncertainty being resolved after election results become available can drive migrants to turn out. With close elections, there is no runaway winner—which makes the election more exciting (i.e., salient) but also unpredictable (i.e., uncertain). To test for this, we model uncertainty as originating from the political ideology of the parties or candidates. If the contenders are of similar ideologies (e.g. on the left-right spectrum), then who ends up winning is less important as both represent the same ideas and policies. However, if the

top two competitors are on opposite ends of the spectrum, the result will decide what type of policies will be implemented, the ensuing political environment, and more. We use the V-Party dataset which codes candidates and parties on different characteristics (Lindberg et al., 2022).<sup>18</sup> Focusing on the left-right ideology, we do not find significant evidence that supports this mechanism. First, we see whether results remain even when considering the sample where the party ideology data exists. Table XXI columns 1-4 show that the finding on close elections persists. Then, limiting the sample with contenders that share the same ideology leads to the same result. We take this as suggestive evidence that uncertainty might not be playing a significant role in explaining how close elections lead to the increase in turnout.

[Table XXI]

## IX. OTHER POLITICAL EVENTS

### *IX.A. Local Elections*

Given the proposed mechanism of salience in general, and election results in particular, we attempt to replicate our findings using other political events. Generally, local elections are deemed less salient than national elections. However, in the transnational context, the national-local distinction can be less clear: on the one hand, national elections can be more influential, but local elections can better connect with migrants as they are more attuned to the needs of the local community (i.e., local politicians are closer to the people they serve).<sup>19</sup> Our results in Table XXII align more with the general consensus. Unlike our previous findings, the evidence presented here signifies that local CoR elections do not impact CoO turnout significantly.

[Table XXII]

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<sup>18</sup>Because the dataset only codes candidates and parties for legislative elections, we assigned their coding for presidential elections whenever applicable.

<sup>19</sup>We limit our sample to local elections that are held nationally or in all sub-national regions of the country. We exclude election events that are either one-off (e.g. referenda) and involve only specific areas at a time (e.g. elections for one state/province/region).

### *IX.B. Conflict Events*

Instead of elections, we now consider other types of political but non-electoral events. Using ACLED to identify dates with very high counts of conflict-related or dates with very high fatalities from conflict-related events, we show in Tables XXIII and XXIV that either turnout is unchanged or actually is lower post-conflict.<sup>20</sup> This is consistent with voters being driven by fear or concern for security, rendering them less likely to participate in elections. As a caveat, the data mostly comes from CoRs in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa, with very few and recent coverage in Europe, which implies a possible skew in the results. Regardless, this seems to suggest that conflict events have a different impact on turnout, contrary to what we find for national elections.<sup>21</sup>

[Table XXIII]

[Table XXIV]

## X. CONCLUSION

Explaining political interdependence across countries is an important endeavour for social scientists interested in political behaviour. Global trends of increasing political interdependence suggest we need to re-evaluate the dynamics that underpin political events and their spillover effects on political behaviour. Complicating things further, the growth of international migration and emigrant enfranchisement in the past decades implies that polities and state boundaries no longer align, calling for the study of how migrant electoral behaviour across borders amplifies political interdependence.

Nowadays, most states include resident non-citizens who are excluded from participating in national elections and non-resident citizens who can participate in the national elections of their homeland. This presents a core challenge for policymakers as they need to combine representative democracy with a highly mobile of citizenry. Responding to this, more than three

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<sup>20</sup>When we refer to conflict, we also mean events of political violence such as protests, riots and battles.

<sup>21</sup>In the literature, protests, conflict and violence have been show to negatively impact turnout (Jones et al., 2017; Condra et al., 2018).



quarters of countries worldwide have granted voting rights to emigrants and in most cases, this has been implemented over the past two decades (Fliess and Østergaard-Nielsen, 2021).

The transnational context provides an ideal laboratory for studying political interdependence, through the effect of country of residence (CoR) elections on migrant turnout in their country of origin (CoO) elections. Exploiting this environment, we can consider the date of CoR elections independent from the date of CoO elections, and vice versa. Specifically, our identification strategy exploits timing differentials between CoO and CoR elections. There are two possibilities: CoO elections can be held before or after the CoR election. Whether a CoO election occurs before or after is argued to be quasi-random owing to the transnational context. To implement this strategy, we construct the Emigrant Voting Patterns (EVP) dataset, the first and largest data source on migrant turnout including 43 CoOs, with voting statistics for each CoR, and for national elections spanning 2000 to 2019.

In this paper, we provide the first causal evidence of a CoR election on migrants' turnout in their CoO election. We find that migrant turnout in CoO elections held after a CoR election is 7 percentage points higher than those held before. This increase in turnout declines in time, and disappears at around 70 days after the CoR election. Our results are consistent with a model of salience where migrants observe close CoR election results and are driven to get out and vote. Alternative explanations such as campaign-induced mobilisation, voter contagion, past voting habits and uncertainty are not borne out in our data.

Against the backdrop of increasing international migration and globalization, analysing turnout in transnational elections is critical to understanding the health of democracy across borders. Importantly, it provides a welcome opportunity to contribute to the debates on political interdependence, in relation to the role of institutions, timing of elections and political participation. Future work on transnational voting behaviour is necessary to improve our understanding of this significant yet understudied phenomenon.

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## Appendix A EVP DATASET COVERAGE

### A.1. Case Selection

EVP is a global national election dataset on the voting behaviour of emigrants on an aggregate level. To identify countries of origin (CoOs) with an enfranchised emigrant electorate we have primarily relied on the Voting from Abroad Database (IDEA, 2021), which provides information on emigrant enfranchisement for national elections in 216 countries worldwide. We have corroborated this information and filled out missing data using secondary sources and by writing to electoral commissions. In doing so, we are also able to distinguish countries that only grant external voting rights on paper but have never held elections abroad (*de jure*) from those countries that have indeed held elections abroad (*de facto*). The relevant universe of cases contains 90 countries which have carried out elections abroad between 2000 and 2019. These countries enable emigrants to cast their vote either in person in an extraterritorial polling centre (e.g. consulates), by mail or online. We exclude countries that require emigrants to return to the home country to vote. For example, Uruguayan emigrants can only vote in homeland elections when they are registered in the National Civic Registry and are physically present in the CoO on election day. We also exclude countries that limit voting from abroad to a specific sub-group of migrants. For example, in Bangladesh, only diplomatic staff can vote from abroad. Table A.1 compares countries that have enfranchised non-resident citizens with those that have not along important indicators.<sup>22</sup>

In a second step, among CoOs with an enfranchised emigrant electorate, we have surveyed their electoral commissions webpages for election results that are disaggregated by country of residence (CoR). We exclude from our sample countries that only have results separating domestic and the total number of votes from abroad. For example, Sweden only reports votes from abroad as a whole, but does not separate it by CoR.

Figure A.1 contains the full list of countries and elections that are included in our sample. In total, EVP covers 180 national elections from 43 countries between 2000 and 2019. We focus

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<sup>22</sup>Surprisingly, countries that have not enfranchised their migrants have higher emigration and immigration rates. In terms of political variables, as expected, countries that have granted migrant voting rights are also more democratic (higher Polity score) and hold free and fair elections.

TABLE A.1  
SUMMARY STATISTICS BY SAMPLE CHOICE

	Enfranchised	Not Enfranchised	Difference	p-value
Emigration (in Millions)	1.305	1.034	-0.271	0.372
Emigration Rate	8.999	18.718	9.719	0.000
Immigration (in Millions)	1.590	0.705	-0.885	0.125
Immigration Rate	7.816	11.493	3.678	0.083
Net Migration (in '000s)	0.068	-0.114	-0.182	0.115
Net Migration Rate	0.053	0.418	0.365	0.810
Employment Rate	54.723	58.502	3.779	0.032
Polity Score	4.746	2.673	-2.073	0.045
Electoral Democracy Index	0.556	0.457	-0.099	0.015
Clean Elections Index	0.587	0.488	-0.099	0.054
Corruption Perception Index	43.718	40.509	-3.209	0.299
GDP per capita	17495.680	20774.973	3279.292	0.396
Trade (% of GDP)	88.463	99.103	10.639	0.218
Population (in Millions)	27.029	48.393	21.364	0.268
Remittances (% of GDP)	3.705	5.952	2.246	0.019

*Notes.* All the variables are from the year 2019, or if unavailable, the most recent year where it is available. The migration variables are from the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs. The economic and demographic variables are from the World Bank. The POLITY Score is from the Center for Systemic Peace. The electoral indices and the corruption perception index are from the Varieties of Democracy Dataset.

on national elections since suffrage is rarely extended to non-resident citizens in lower-order elections (Arrighi and Lafleur, 2019). For each country, we include both legislative and direct presidential elections if the emigrants are enfranchised in both of these elections and the data is available, regardless of whether both elections were held the same day. We discard constituent assembly elections, however, because of their uniqueness (e.g. Ecuador 2007, Tunisia 2011).

When emigrants can elect MPs in more than one chamber (e.g. Italy), we only include the elections in the lower house. Depending on data availability, EVP includes between 1 and 11 elections per CoO. For example, in the case of the Ivory Coast we were only able to include the 2010 presidential elections while in the Croatian case, we were able to include all 11 national elections held between 2000 and 2019. Countries in EVP with several elections have no time gaps, i.e., all these elections were consecutively held and EVP contains them all. The most common reason is that the data was not available online and that subsequent data requests to the electoral commission have remained unanswered. Finally, in presidential elections with run-offs and legislative elections with second rounds, we only included the results from the first

round.

In summary, the exclusion criteria are as follows. First, countries have not enfranchised non-resident citizens using our definition above. Second, countries have enfranchised non-resident citizens, but the authorities do not specifically collect data on emigrant voting. For example, the electoral commission of the United Kingdom stated in an email to us that “we do not hold more detailed breakdowns for overseas electors, highlighting which countries they resided in, or whether they cast their vote”. Third, countries have enfranchised non-resident citizens and the authorities provide separate emigrant voting results, but these results are not available disaggregated by CoR. This is for example the case in Mongolia and Slovenia which only collect emigrant voting results on the aggregate CoO level. Fourth, countries have enfranchised non-resident citizens and collect information regarding their voting behaviour per CoR, but they are not willing to share this data with a reference to personal data protection. For example, the electoral commission of South Africa wrote in an email to us that “we do not disaggregate the data because there are some missions with very few voters which would compromise the secrecy of the vote”. Fifth, in several instances the electoral commission, state ministry, or state agency that was contacted did not respond to our data request. This has occurred in a disproportionate manner in cases of less democratic countries and more fragile states. We acknowledge that this is a challenge that scholars commonly face when they build global election datasets that also aim to collect fine-grained data in electoral autocracies.

## ***A.2. Geographical Distribution***

In terms of geographical distribution, our dataset contains CoOs from all regions except for North America and South Asia. Table A.2 shows the distribution of CoOs and elections by region. Contrary to other studies, our dataset features a more balanced distribution of countries with less emphasis on EU member states and a higher proportion of countries belonging to Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa. Yet due to better data availability, more than a third of elections are still from EU member states.

Looking at CoRs, our dataset contains almost all countries worldwide. Table A.3 shows that more than a quarter of observations have residence in EU member states, which is due to large

TABLE A.2  
GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF CoOs AND ELECTIONS

Region	No. of CoOs	%	No. of Elections	%
EU Member States	9	20.93	64	35.56
East Asia and Pacific	3	6.98	9	5.00
Latin America and the Caribbean	11	25.58	50	27.78
Middle East & North Africa	2	4.65	3	1.67
Non-EU Europe and Central Asia	7	16.28	37	20.56
North America	0	0.00	0	0.00
South Asia	0	0.00	0	0.00
Sub-Saharan Africa	11	25.58	17	9.44
Total	43	100.00	180	100.00

*Notes.* Countries are assigned based on the World Bank region classification. To distinguish between EU and Non-EU countries, we make use of the official list of EU countries.

waves of migration to the EU. On average, there are 55 CoRs per election, with a minimum of 1 and a maximum of 161.<sup>23</sup>

TABLE A.3  
GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF CoRs AND OBSERVATIONS

Region	No. of CoRs	%	No. of Observations	%
EU Member States	27	13.33	2,944	27.76
East Asia and Pacific	37	17.05	1,234	11.64
Latin America and the Caribbean	44	20.28	1,522	14.35
Middle East & North Africa	20	9.22	1,393	13.14
Non-EU Europe and Central Asia	27	15.38	1,803	17.00
North America	3	1.38	316	2.98
South Asia	7	3.23	270	2.55
Sub-Saharan Africa	48	22.12	1,123	10.59
Total	217	100.00	10,605	100.00

*Notes.* Countries are assigned based on the World Bank region classification. To distinguish between EU and Non-EU countries, we make use of the official list of EU countries.

### A.3. *Timeline of Elections*

The dataset covers 43 CoOs and 180 elections from 2000-2019, visualised in Figure A.1. From a temporal perspective, more recent elections are more likely to be available due to the accessibility of digital data. Countries with elections *only* occurring more recently are those that just enfranchised their migrants or implemented external voting. For example, Timor Leste only

<sup>23</sup>Honduras only allows emigrants in the USA to vote, while France allows emigrants in 161 countries and territories to vote.

implemented emigrant voting last 2017, while Paraguay only enfranchised its migrants in 2013.




FIGURE A.1  
Election Timeline




FIGURE A.1  
Election Timeline (cont'd.)

NOTE. The shape refers to which election/s took place in each year: a diamond implies that both presidential and legislative elections occurred, a circle means that only a presidential election was held, while a square signifies that only a legislative election was held. The shape is shaded black if the election is included in our dataset, while it is left unshaded if the election is excluded for whatever reason (e.g., data is unavailable, data was not given, etc.). For shaded diamonds, the text refers to which specific elections are available: P stands for presidential election, L for legislative election and A for both elections.

## Appendix B SAMPLE CONSTRUCTION DETAILS

### *B.1. General Approach*

In constructing the sample for this paper, we merge the EVP Dataset with the NELDA Dataset. The merging of both datasets necessitated making several choices, which we outline below:

- whether to merge all rounds of elections *or* just the first round from NELDA
- whether to merge one EVP (CoO) election with the closest or nearest NELDA (CoR) election in time (regardless of whether it is before or after) *or* merge one EVP (CoO) election with the two closest NELDA (CoR) elections: one before and one after the EVP (CoO) election.
- whether same day elections of different types (i.e., presidential and legislative) will be both included or only one of them will be included.

For the first choice, we considered the merging of *only* first round CoR elections from NELDA to be consistent with our EVP dataset, which only includes first round CoO elections. For the second choice, we merged one CoO election from EVP with two CoR elections from NELDA: (1) the nearest election among all elections before and (2) the nearest among all elections after the CoO election. For the third choice, we include both presidential and legislative election even when they are held on the same day. The final dataset includes 19,887 CoO-CoR-level observations from 2000 to 2019. While our final sample reflects our preferred options, none of our choices significantly affects our core results. Below, we show that our empirical findings remain robust to such decisions.

### *B.2. Removing Same Day Elections*

In some countries, national elections for the executive and legislative occur on the same day. Our default choice was to include both elections. However, because they are held simultaneously, their turnout statistics are likely to be identical (except for cases when different ballots need to be filled out, and people may opt to fill out just one but not the other). To avoid this potential



issue of double counting, we do the following: either remove the presidential elections when elections are concurrent, or remove the legislative elections. Below we show that results do not change drastically, and remain statistically significant in the same windows.

TABLE B.1  
DROPPING SAME DAY ELECTIONS

	Drop Presidential				Drop Legislative			
	15 days	30 days	60 days	90 days	15 days	30 days	60 days	90 days
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Post-Election	0.0675* (0.0386)	0.0694** (0.0292)	0.0568*** (0.0203)	0.0419** (0.0179)	0.0713* (0.0404)	0.0747** (0.0301)	0.0607*** (0.0209)	0.0462** (0.0183)
Dep Var Mean	.566	.57	.566	.561	.569	.576	.57	.565
R <sup>2</sup>	.0102	.0113	.00747	.00403	.0111	.013	.00845	.00484
N	277	503	885	1,242	264	481	847	1,181

NOTE. Robust standard errors are clustered at the country of residence (CoR) level. Dependent variable is the emigrant turnout in country of origin (CoO) elections. The unit of observation is a CoO-CoR pair. Column titles indicate the number of days before and after the country of residence (CoR) election included in the particular window. The shortest is a 30-day window (i.e., 15 days before and after), while the longest is a 180-day window (i.e., 90 days before and after). The first four columns drop presidential elections that occur on the same day as the legislative elections, while we do the opposite for the last four columns. \*\*\*, \*\* and \* denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.

### B.3. Merging Only One Election

In merging the EVP dataset with the NELDA dataset, we chose to match each EVP election with two NELDA elections: the closest CoR election before the CoO election, and the closest CoR election after. This is an attempt to potentially increase the sample size, allowing for more variation in the data. In this subsection, we investigate whether this choice has important ramifications to the results. Reassuringly, the findings are unaltered — this is because observations, especially in the tighter windows, are unaffected by this choice.

### B.4. Including All Rounds of Elections

The EVP dataset only includes first-round elections when there are runoffs or subsequent elections. To mimic this, we initially chose to merge only the first round of elections when matching the closest CoR elections in the NELDA dataset. Apart from consistency, we chose to do this because the first round is usually believed to be more salient. In addition, succeeding rounds can also muddle two effects: the first-round result effect and the second-round campaign effect.

TABLE B.2  
TURNOUT BY *N*-DAY WINDOWS (ONE ELECTION MATCH)

	15 days	30 days	60 days	90 days	120 days	150 days	180 days	360 days
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Post-Election	0.0689*	0.0687**	0.0590***	0.0415**	0.0163	0.0129	0.0119	0.00173
	(0.0373)	(0.0287)	(0.0206)	(0.0180)	(0.0171)	(0.0152)	(0.0143)	(0.0102)
Dep Var Mean	.568	.57	.568	.562	.561	.56	.561	.563
R <sup>2</sup>	.0109	.0113	.00817	.00402	.000628	.000401	.000346	7.46e-06
N	287	520	899	1,265	1,640	2,025	2,467	4,483

NOTE. Robust standard errors are clustered at the country of residence (CoR) level. Dependent variable is the emigrant turnout in country of origin (CoO) elections. The unit of observation is a CoO-CoR pair. Column titles indicate the number of days before and after the country of residence (CoR) election included in the particular window. The shortest is a 30-day window (i.e., 15 days before and after), while the longest is a 720-day window (i.e., 1 year before and after). \*\*\*, \*\* and \* denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.

Hence, the alternative is to merge other rounds of the CoR elections as well. Again, we show that results are essentially unchanged.

TABLE B.3  
TURNOUT BY *N*-DAY WINDOWS (ALL ELECTION ROUNDS)

	15 days	30 days	60 days	90 days	120 days	150 days	180 days	360 days
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Post-Election	0.0438	0.0537**	0.0428**	0.0344**	0.0146	0.0134	0.0122	0.00592
	(0.0334)	(0.0260)	(0.0200)	(0.0168)	(0.0162)	(0.0144)	(0.0136)	(0.00894)
Dep Var Mean	.57	.565	.562	.561	.561	.562	.562	.568
R <sup>2</sup>	.00446	.00697	.00431	.00279	.000505	.000433	.000363	.0000877
N	340	585	986	1,371	1,759	2,182	2,667	4,933

NOTE. Robust standard errors are clustered at the country of residence (CoR) level. Dependent variable is the emigrant turnout in country of origin (CoO) elections. The unit of observation is a CoO-CoR pair. Column titles indicate the number of days before and after the country of residence (CoR) election included in the particular window. The shortest is a 30-day window (i.e., 15 days before and after), while the longest is a 720-day window (i.e., 1 year before and after). \*\*\*, \*\* and \* denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.

## Appendix C COUNTRY-SPECIFIC FIXED EFFECTS

### C.1. Inclusion of CoR Fixed Effects

TABLE C.1  
ADDING CoR FIXED EFFECTS

	15 days	30 days	60 days	90 days	120 days	150 days	180 days	360 days
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Post-Election	0.0984*	0.0827**	0.0631***	0.0381**	0.0177	0.0176	0.0172	0.00856
	(0.0512)	(0.0370)	(0.0221)	(0.0175)	(0.0169)	(0.0145)	(0.0137)	(0.00863)
Dep Var Mean	.568	.569	.567	.563	.561	.56	.561	.567
R <sup>2</sup>	.0214	.0156	.00925	.00344	.000773	.000778	.000758	.000194
N	290	525	922	1,305	1,695	2,111	2,583	4,865

NOTE. Robust standard errors are clustered at the country of residence (CoR) level. Dependent variable is the emigrant turnout in country of origin (CoO) elections. The unit of observation is a CoO-CoR pair. Column titles indicate the number of days before and after the country of residence (CoR) election included in the particular window. The shortest is a 30-day window (i.e., 15 days before and after), while the longest is a 720-day window (i.e., 1 year before and after). \*\*\*, \*\* and \* denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.

### C.2. Inclusion of CoO Fixed Effects

TABLE C.2  
ADDING CoO FIXED EFFECTS

	15 days	30 days	60 days	90 days	120 days	150 days	180 days	360 days
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Post-Election	0.0345	0.0302	0.0245	0.0225*	0.0151	0.0138	0.0155*	0.00934
	(0.0233)	(0.0213)	(0.0176)	(0.0135)	(0.0111)	(0.00990)	(0.00935)	(0.00675)
Dep Var Mean	.568	.569	.567	.563	.561	.56	.561	.567
R <sup>2</sup>	.617	.607	.56	.553	.544	.539	.535	.532
N	290	525	922	1,305	1,695	2,111	2,583	4,865

NOTE. Robust standard errors are clustered at the country of residence (CoR) level. Dependent variable is the emigrant turnout in country of origin (CoO) elections. The unit of observation is a CoO-CoR pair. Column titles indicate the number of days before and after the country of residence (CoR) election included in the particular window. The shortest is a 30-day window (i.e., 15 days before and after), while the longest is a 720-day window (i.e., 1 year before and after). \*\*\*, \*\* and \* denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.

### C.3. Inclusion of CoO and CoR Fixed Effects

TABLE C.3  
 ADDING CoO AND CoR FIXED EFFECTS

	15 days	30 days	60 days	90 days	120 days	150 days	180 days	360 days
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Post-Election	0.0135 (0.0361)	0.0206 (0.0249)	0.0264 (0.0181)	0.0206 (0.0136)	0.0157 (0.0114)	0.0176* (0.0102)	0.0194* (0.00991)	0.0123* (0.00697)
Dep Var Mean	.568	.569	.567	.563	.561	.56	.561	.567
R <sup>2</sup>	.662	.646	.582	.554	.54	.536	.531	.524
N	290	525	922	1,305	1,695	2,111	2,583	4,865

NOTE. Robust standard errors are clustered at the country of residence (CoR) level. Dependent variable is the emigrant turnout in country of origin (CoO) elections. The unit of observation is a CoO-CoR pair. Column titles indicate the number of days before and after the country of residence (CoR) election included in the particular window. The shortest is a 30-day window (i.e., 15 days before and after), while the longest is a 720-day window (i.e., 1 year before and after). \*\*\*, \*\* and \* denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.

## Appendix D ALTERNATIVE STRATEGY: RD

### D.1. Regression Discontinuity Plot




FIGURE D.1

#### Turnout by Mode of Voting

NOTE. Horizontal axis shows the number of days from the country of residence (CoR) election. Each gray circle corresponds to the mean of the turnout for each chosen bin. Solid black curves are smoothed local quadratic polynomials on either side of the discontinuity.

### D.2. Regression Discontinuity Results

TABLE D.1  
REGRESSION DISCONTINUITY

	Full Sample				Sample Excluding Mail Voting			
	Bandwidth: CCT		Bandwidth: IK		Bandwidth: CCT		Bandwidth: IK	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Post-Election	0.0596** (0.0254)	0.0400 (0.0309)	0.0716** (0.0301)	0.0890** (0.0402)	0.0931*** (0.0291)	0.0931** (0.0379)	0.130*** (0.0361)	0.147*** (0.0494)
Dep Var Mean	.565	.565	.561	.561	.614	.614	.611	.611
Function	Quadratic	Cubic	Quadratic	Cubic	Quadratic	Cubic	Quadratic	Cubic
Bandwidth	CCT=444	CCT=444	IK=276	IK=276	CCT=446	CCT=446	IK=276	IK=276
R <sup>2</sup>	.00169	.0029	.00271	.00289	.00373	.00574	.00828	.00841
N	5,325	5,325	3,630	3,630	3,824	3,824	2,581	2,581

NOTE. Robust standard errors are clustered at the country of residence (CoR) level. Dependent variable is the emigrant turnout in country of origin (CoO) elections. The unit of observation is a CoO-CoR pair. Column titles indicate the optimal bandwidth method employed. Columns 1-2 and 5-6 use the Calonico et al. (2014) selection method while columns 3-4 and 7-8 use the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) selection method. The rows indicating function and bandwidth respectively show the particular functional form of the running variable used and the specific bandwidth value used. \*\*\*, \*\* and \* denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.

### D.3. McCrary Density Test




FIGURE D.2  
McCrary Density Test

NOTE: Horizontal axis shows the number of days from the country of residence (CoR) election. The gray bands represent the 95% confidence intervals. The vertical axis measures the density of the country of origin (CoO) elections.

## Appendix E GOOGLE TRENDS KEYWORDS




FIGURE E.1

### Google Trends 'Interest over Time' Index

NOTE. The dependent variable is the Google 'Interest over Time' Index. The horizontal axis ranges from 30 days before to 30 days after the country of origin (CoO) election. The vertical red dashed line signifies the day of the CoO election. The blue (gray) square is the coefficient estimate for observations whose CoO election occurs after (before) the CoR election, with the thick blue (gray) bar showing the corresponding 90% confidence interval and the thin blue (gray) bar showing the corresponding 95% confidence interval.

#### *E.1. News Organizations*

- Bolivia - Los Tiempos, La Razón Bolivia
- Bosnia and Herzegovina - Glas Srpske, Dnevni avaz, Oslobodenje, Nezavisne novine
- Brazil - Estado de Minas, O Estado de S. Paulo, O Globo, Correio Braziliense, Folha de S.Paulo
- Bulgaria - 24 Chasa, Dnevnik, Trud
- Cameroon - Cameroon Tribune, Journal du Cameroun
- Cape Verde - A Semana, A Nação, Expresso das Ilhas
- Chile - El Mercurio, Diario Financiero, La Tercera, La Segunda, Radio Bío-Bío
- Colombia - El Universal, Vanguardia, La Crónica del Quindío, El Tiempo
- Costa Rica - Crhoy, La Nacion - Costa Rica, Diario Extra
- Cote d'Ivoire - Fraternité Matin, Linfodrome
- Croatia - Slobodna Dalmacija, Novi list, Jutarnji list, Večernji list

- Czech Republic - Hospodářské noviny, Denník N, Haló noviny, Lidové noviny
- Dominican Republic - Diario Libre, Listín Diario, Periódico El Caribe
- Ecuador - El Comercio, El Universo
- Equatorial Guinea - Diario Rombe
- France - Libération, Le Monde, Le Figaro, Les Echos, La Tribune
- Georgia - netgazeti, Interpressnews, Tavisupleba, Tabula
- Guinea - Guinée Matin, Africa Guinee
- Honduras - Tiempo Honduras, La Tribuna, La Prensa
- Indonesia - Rakyat Merdeka, Jawa Pos, Republika, Media Indonesia
- Iran - Hamshahri, Abrar Iran, Ettela'at, Tehran Times, Bahar Newspaper
- Italy - Il Sole 24 Ore, Corriere della Sera, Avvenire, il manifesto, La Stampa
- Latvia - Lsm.lv, TV Net, Delfi
- Macedonia - Nova Makedonija, Večer, Sloboden Pečat, Nezavisen Vesnik
- Mali - Afribone, L'Essor Mali
- Mauritania - Alakhbar, Cridem, Sahara Media Agency, AMI
- Moldova - Moldova Suverană, Unimedia, Publika TV
- Mozambique - Mozambique Channel, Notícias - Newspaper
- Paraguay - Última Hora - Paraguay, ABC Color, La Nación - Paraguay, Diario Popular
- Peru - El Comercio, La República, El Peruano, Diario Correo
- Philippines - The Manila Times, Philippine Daily Inquirer, Manila Standard, Manila Bulletin, The Philippine Star
- Poland - Puls Biznesu, Rzeczpospolita, Super Express, Gazeta Wyborcza
- Portugal - Observador, Diário de Notícias, Correio da Manhã, Expresso, Público
- Romania - România liberă, Evenimentul Zilei, Ziarul Financiar, Libertatea, Adevărul
- Sao Tome and Principe - Tela Non
- Senegal - Le Soleil - Senegal
- South Africa - SABC News, City Press, The Independent on Saturday
- Timor - Tempo Timor, Tatoli
- Tunisia - Assabah News, La Presse de Tunisie, Assarih



- Turkey - Milliyet, Hürriyet, Sabah, Posta - Newspaper, Sözcü
- Ukraine - Kyiv Post, Interfax-Ukraine, Uryadovy Kuryer, Dzerkalo Tyzhnia
- Venezuela - Diario 2001, El Universal (Caracas), Tal Cual, Últimas Noticias
- Yugoslavia - Blic, Večernje novosti, Danas, Politika

## *E.2. Electoral Commission*

- Bolivia - Plurinational Electoral Organ
- Bosnia and Herzegovina - Central Election Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina
- Brazil - Superior Electoral Court
- Bulgaria - Central Election Commission
- Cape Verde - Comissão Nacional de Eleições
- Chile - Servel
- Colombia - Consejo Nacional Electoral Colombiano
- Costa Rica - Supreme Electoral Court of Costa Rica
- Cote d'Ivoire - Commission Electorale Independante
- Croatia - Državno izborno povjerenstvo Republike Hrvatske
- Czech Republic - Ministerstvo vnitra České republiky
- Dominican Republic - Central Electoral Board
- Ecuador - Consejo Nacional Electoral
- France - Ministère de l'intérieur
- Georgia - CESKO Georgia
- Honduras - National Electoral Council
- Indonesia - General Elections Commission of Indonesia
- Iran - Guardian Council
- Italy - Dipartimento per gli Affari Interni e Territoriali
- Latvia - Central Election Commission of Latvia
- Macedonia - State Election Commission of the Republic of Macedonia
- Paraguay - Superior Court of Electoral Justice
- Peru - Oficina Nacional de Procesos Electorales

- Philippines - Commission on Elections
- Poland - National Electoral Commission
- Portugal - Comissão Nacional de Eleições
- Romania - Permanent Electoral Authority
- South Africa - Electoral Commission of South Africa
- Timor - Comissão Nacional de Eleições
- Tunisia - Independent High Authority for Elections
- Turkey - Supreme Election Council
- Ukraine - The Central Election Commission of Ukraine
- Venezuela - National Electoral Council

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## TABLES

TABLE I  
SUMMARY STATISTICS BY SAMPLE CHOICE

	Included	Excluded	Difference	p-value
Emigration (in Millions)	1.413	1.249	-0.165	0.647
Emigration Rate	10.310	8.291	-2.018	0.245
Immigration (in Millions)	1.006	1.896	0.890	0.327
Immigration Rate	4.368	9.675	5.307	0.004
Net Migration (in '000s)	-0.014	0.113	0.127	0.430
Net Migration Rate	-1.266	0.782	2.047	0.258
Employment Rate	54.456	54.858	0.402	0.854
Polity Score	6.073	4.000	-2.073	0.070
Electoral Democracy Index	0.594	0.534	-0.059	0.214
Clean Elections Index	0.640	0.556	-0.084	0.177
Corruption Perception Index	39.884	45.946	6.062	0.115
GDP per capita	8668.253	21760.617	13092.364	0.001
Trade (% of GDP)	78.564	93.355	14.791	0.145
Population (in Millions)	33.445	23.964	-9.480	0.310
Remittances (% of GDP)	4.160	3.454	-0.706	0.513

*Notes.* All the variables are from the year 2019, or if unavailable, the most recent year where it is available. The migration variables are from the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs. The economic and demographic variables are from the World Bank. The POLITY Score is from the Center for Systemic Peace. The electoral indices and the corruption perception index are from the Varieties of Democracy Dataset.

TABLE II  
GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION

Region	Freq. (CoO)	%	Freq. (CoR)	%
EU Member States	10,016	50.36	5,658	28.45
East Asia and Pacific	1,498	7.53	2,202	11.07
Latin America & the Caribbean	4,241	21.33	2,886	14.51
Middle East & North Africa	288	1.45	2,434	12.24
Non-EU Europe & Central Asia	3,238	16.28	3,465	17.42
North America	0	0.00	629	3.16
South Asia	0	0.00	516	2.59
Sub-Saharan Africa	606	3.05	2,097	10.54
Total	19,887	100.00	19,887	100.00

*Notes.* Countries are assigned based on the World Bank region classification. To distinguish between EU and Non-EU countries, we make use of the official list of EU countries.

TABLE III  
CoO AND CoR ELECTIONS

	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	N
Number of CoR per CoO	56.42	44.04	1	174	43
Number of CoR per CoO Election	56.37	37.67	1	166	180
Number of CoO per CoR	13.11	9.10	1	40	185
Number of CoO per CoR Election	8.23	6.55	1	34	1,267
Number of CoO-CoR Elections	8.01	5.77	1	22	2,426

*Notes.* As before, we use CoO to denote the country of origin and CoR for the country of residence.

TABLE IV  
SUMMARY STATISTICS BY  $N$ -DAY WINDOW

Variable	15 days	30 days	60 days	90 days	120 days	150 days	180 days	360 days
Elections Before	161	284	474	659	844	1,048	1,287	2,433
Elections After	129	241	448	646	851	1,063	1,296	2,432
Days Before	7.22	14.5	26.83	40.10	54.69	70.59	88.10	172.9
Days After	9.64	16.34	29.27	43.33	58.38	73.82	90.22	172.0
CoO Turnout Before	53.79	53.88	53.94	54.19	55.29	55.47	55.54	56.48
CoO Turnout After	60.62	60.53	59.62	58.37	56.84	56.60	56.70	56.85
CoR Turnout	66.07	65.96	65.93	66.03	66.11	65.91	65.78	65.99

*Notes.* Column titles indicate the number of days before and after the country of residence (CoR) election included in the particular window. The shortest is a 30-day window (i.e., 15 days before and after), while the longest is a 720-day window (i.e., 1 year before and after).

TABLE V  
TURNOUT BY *N*-DAY WINDOWS

	15 days	30 days	60 days	90 days	120 days	150 days	180 days	360 days
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Post-Election	0.0683*	0.0665**	0.0569***	0.0417**	0.0155	0.0113	0.0116	0.00371
	(0.0371)	(0.0285)	(0.0198)	(0.0175)	(0.0164)	(0.0146)	(0.0140)	(0.00906)
Dep Var Mean	.568	.569	.567	.563	.561	.56	.561	.567
R <sup>2</sup>	.0108	.0107	.00767	.0041	.00057	.000307	.000329	.0000344
No. of CoO	30	31	35	35	36	36	37	39
No. of CoR	109	128	144	157	163	169	174	178
CoO Elections	95	110	126	128	131	132	137	142
CoR Elections	229	361	534	633	704	767	822	982
N	290	525	922	1,305	1,695	2,111	2,583	4,865

*Notes.* Robust standard errors are clustered at the country of residence (CoR) level. Dependent variable is the emigrant turnout in country of origin (CoO) elections. The unit of observation is a CoO-CoR pair. Column titles indicate the number of days before and after the country of residence (CoR) election included in the particular window. The shortest is a 30-day window (i.e., 15 days before and after), while the longest is a 720-day window (i.e., 1 year before and after). \*\*\*,\*\* and \* denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.

TABLE VI  
INTERACTED WITH DAYS TO/FROM CoR ELECTION

	15 days	30 days	60 days	90 days	120 days	150 days	180 days	360 days
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Post-Election	-0.0528 (0.0852)	0.0279 (0.0610)	0.0316 (0.0426)	0.0595* (0.0341)	0.0824*** (0.0289)	0.0627** (0.0255)	0.0467** (0.0233)	0.0395** (0.0200)
Days	-0.00678 (0.00489)	-0.00106 (0.00210)	-0.000109 (0.000722)	0.000153 (0.000484)	0.000519 (0.000336)	0.000315 (0.000212)	0.000196 (0.000157)	0.000175*** (0.0000657)
Post × Days	0.0143* (0.00795)	0.00248 (0.00340)	0.000873 (0.00127)	-0.000422 (0.000746)	-0.00118** (0.000485)	-0.000711** (0.000322)	-0.000394 (0.000243)	-0.000207* (0.000107)
Dep Var Mean	.568	.569	.567	.563	.561	.56	.561	.567
R <sup>2</sup>	.0218	.0119	.0084	.0044	.0048	.00279	.00146	.0018
N	290	525	922	1,305	1,695	2,111	2,583	4,865

*Notes.* Robust standard errors are clustered at the country of residence (CoR) level. Dependent variable is the emigrant turnout in country of origin (CoO) elections. The unit of observation is a CoO-CoR pair. Column titles indicate the number of days before and after the country of residence (CoR) election included in the particular window. The shortest is a 30-day window (i.e., 15 days before and after), while the longest is a 720-day window (i.e., 1 year before and after). \*\*\*,\*\* and \* denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.

TABLE VII  
 ADDING TIME FIXED EFFECTS (60-DAY WINDOW)

	None	Day (CoO)	Day (CoR)	Day (Both)	Month (CoO)	Month (CoR)	Month (Both)	Year
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Post-Election	0.0665** (0.0285)	0.0865*** (0.0266)	0.0651** (0.0292)	0.0852*** (0.0276)	0.0500* (0.0256)	0.0750** (0.0330)	0.0422 (0.0420)	0.0405 (0.0268)
Dep Var Mean	.569	.569	.569	.569	.569	.569	.569	.569
R <sup>2</sup>	.0107	.145	.0184	.15	.14	.108	.162	.19
N	525	525	525	525	525	525	525	525

*Notes.* Robust standard errors are clustered at the country of residence (CoR) level. Dependent variable is the emigrant turnout in country of origin (CoO) elections. The unit of observation is a CoO-CoR pair. Column titles indicate the fixed effects included in the specification. The table uses a 60-day window (i.e., 30 days before and after the CoR election). \*\*\*, \*\* and \* denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.



TABLE VIII  
TURNOUT BY ELECTION REGULARITY

	15 days	30 days	60 days	90 days	120 days	150 days	180 days	360 days
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Post-Election	0.0565 (0.0409)	0.0723** (0.0303)	0.0609*** (0.0225)	0.0399** (0.0195)	0.0176 (0.0184)	0.0157 (0.0167)	0.0166 (0.0152)	0.00683 (0.0102)
Interval	-0.0382 (0.0873)	0.0139 (0.0601)	-0.0131 (0.0497)	-0.00301 (0.0384)	0.00134 (0.0359)	0.0169 (0.0323)	0.0146 (0.0269)	0.000353 (0.0246)
Post × Interval	0.0826 (0.112)	-0.0348 (0.0776)	-0.0265 (0.0604)	0.00770 (0.0479)	-0.0154 (0.0460)	-0.0261 (0.0408)	-0.0291 (0.0356)	-0.0180 (0.0299)
Dep Var Mean	.568	.569	.567	.562	.56	.56	.561	.566
R <sup>2</sup>	.0128	.0111	.00866	.00404	.000665	.000554	.000622	.000257
N	290	525	921	1,304	1,693	2,108	2,580	4,856

*Notes.* Robust standard errors are clustered at the country of residence (CoR) level. Dependent variable is the emigrant turnout in country of origin (CoO) elections. The unit of observation is a CoO-CoR pair. Column titles indicate the number of days before and after the country of residence (CoR) election included in the particular window. The shortest is a 30-day window (i.e., 15 days before and after), while the longest is a 720-day window (i.e., 1 year before and after). \*\*\*,\*\* and \* denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.

TABLE IX  
 ADDING CONTROLS (60-DAY WINDOW)

	None	Corruption	GDP	Trade	Distance	All
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Post-Election	0.0665** (0.0285)	0.0638** (0.0296)	0.0529* (0.0294)	0.0800*** (0.0292)	0.0631** (0.0294)	0.0528* (0.0311)
Dep Var Mean	.569	.57	.567	.564	.57	.565
Controls	.0107	.0251	.0344	.028	.0613	.0942
R <sup>2</sup>	525	516	476	499	521	456

*Notes.* Robust standard errors are clustered at the country of residence (CoR) level. Dependent variable is the emigrant turnout in country of origin (CoO) elections. The unit of observation is a CoO-CoR pair. Column titles indicate the controls included in the specification. The table uses a 60-day window (i.e., 30 days before and after the CoR election). \*\*\*,\*\* and \* denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.

TABLE X  
TURNOUT AND VOTING BY MAIL

	15 days	30 days	60 days	90 days	120 days	150 days	180 days	360 days
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Post-Election	0.121** (0.0496)	0.102*** (0.0348)	0.0941*** (0.0231)	0.0742*** (0.0189)	0.0405** (0.0184)	0.0277* (0.0159)	0.0194 (0.0148)	0.0161 (0.0105)
Mail	-0.0780 (0.0540)	-0.131*** (0.0435)	-0.112*** (0.0313)	-0.138*** (0.0255)	-0.150*** (0.0240)	-0.162*** (0.0215)	-0.170*** (0.0188)	-0.166*** (0.0132)
Post × Mail	-0.140* (0.0839)	-0.105* (0.0617)	-0.120** (0.0465)	-0.0950** (0.0385)	-0.0601* (0.0344)	-0.0363 (0.0304)	-0.0145 (0.0268)	-0.0292* (0.0173)
Dep Var Mean	.568	.569	.567	.562	.56	.56	.56	.566
R <sup>2</sup>	.0634	.0819	.0731	.0758	.0655	.0641	.0626	.0672
N	290	525	921	1,303	1,692	2,107	2,577	4,852

*Notes.* Robust standard errors are clustered at the country of residence (CoR) level. Dependent variable is the emigrant turnout in country of origin (CoO) elections. The unit of observation is a CoO-CoR pair. Column titles indicate the number of days before and after the country of residence (CoR) election included in the particular window. The shortest is a 30-day window (i.e., 15 days before and after), while the longest is a 720-day window (i.e., 1 year before and after). \*\*\*,\*\* and \* denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.

TABLE XI  
TURNOUT AND REGISTRATION

	15 days	30 days	60 days	90 days	120 days	150 days	180 days	360 days
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Post-Election	0.141 (0.0897)	0.170*** (0.0629)	0.180*** (0.0445)	0.170*** (0.0396)	0.107*** (0.0380)	0.0630** (0.0311)	0.0504* (0.0298)	-0.000572 (0.0236)
Register	-0.00615 (0.0630)	0.0651 (0.0442)	0.0913*** (0.0337)	0.0859*** (0.0281)	0.0471 (0.0309)	0.0220 (0.0263)	0.0147 (0.0253)	-0.00994 (0.0192)
Post × Register	-0.0824 (0.101)	-0.122* (0.0698)	-0.148*** (0.0514)	-0.153*** (0.0439)	-0.110*** (0.0409)	-0.0630* (0.0337)	-0.0466 (0.0325)	0.00589 (0.0271)
Dep Var Mean	.568	.569	.567	.562	.56	.56	.56	.566
R <sup>2</sup>	.0142	.0156	.0159	.0119	.00458	.00175	.00116	.000128
N	290	525	920	1,302	1,691	2,105	2,574	4,847

*Notes.* Robust standard errors are clustered at the country of residence (CoR) level. Dependent variable is the emigrant turnout in country of origin (CoO) elections. The unit of observation is a CoO-CoR pair. Column titles indicate the number of days before and after the country of residence (CoR) election included in the particular window. The shortest is a 30-day window (i.e., 15 days before and after), while the longest is a 720-day window (i.e., 1 year before and after). \*\*\*,\*\* and \* denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.

TABLE XII  
GOOGLE TRENDS FOR NEWS ORGANIZATIONS

	None (1)	Time (2)	Country (3)	Election (4)	All (5)
Post-Election	-2.249*** (0.419)	-2.067*** (0.502)	-2.249*** (0.420)	-2.249*** (0.421)	-2.194*** (0.399)
CoO after CoR	-2.648* (1.526)	-7.532*** (1.896)	-3.778*** (1.094)	-3.325*** (0.695)	-2.895*** (0.702)
Post $\times$ CoO $>$ CoR	6.067*** (0.507)	5.336*** (0.498)	6.067*** (0.508)	6.067*** (0.510)	5.194*** (0.474)
Dep Var Mean	45.1	45.1	45.1	45.1	45.1
R <sup>2</sup>	.00602	.402	.514	.676	.719
N	34,648	34,648	34,648	34,648	34,648

*Notes.* Robust standard errors are clustered at the country of residence (CoR) level. Dependent variable is the Google ‘Interest over Time’ Index for news organizations. The unit of observation is a CoO-CoR pair. Column titles indicate the fixed effects included in the specification. The observations are within a 30-day window (i.e., 15 days before and after a CoR election). \*\*\*,\*\* and \* denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.

TABLE XIII  
GOOGLE TRENDS FOR ELECTORAL COMMISSIONS

	None (1)	Time (2)	Country (3)	Election (4)	All (5)
Post-Election	-7.113*** (0.403)	-6.846*** (0.485)	-7.113*** (0.404)	-7.113*** (0.406)	-6.780*** (0.484)
CoO after CoR	-7.639*** (1.054)	-5.676*** (1.057)	-6.350*** (0.689)	-7.849*** (0.711)	-7.025*** (0.709)
Post $\times$ CoO $>$ CoR	14.24*** (0.538)	12.67*** (0.612)	14.24*** (0.540)	14.24*** (0.542)	12.56*** (0.615)
Dep Var Mean	12	12	12	12	12
R <sup>2</sup>	.0303	.196	.207	.237	.261
N	29,707	29,707	29,707	29,707	29,707

*Notes.* Robust standard errors are clustered at the country of residence (CoR) level. Dependent variable is the Google ‘Interest over Time’ Index for electoral commissions. The unit of observation is a CoO-CoR pair. Column titles indicate the fixed effects included in the specification. The observations are within a 30-day window (i.e., 15 days before and after a CoR election). \*\*\*,\*\* and \* denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.

TABLE XIV  
TURNOUT AND CLOSE ELECTIONS

	15 days	30 days	60 days	90 days	120 days	150 days	180 days	360 days
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Post-Election	-0.0168 (0.0585)	0.0163 (0.0469)	-0.00192 (0.0368)	-0.00236 (0.0301)	-0.0182 (0.0293)	-0.0199 (0.0251)	-0.0220 (0.0234)	-0.0165 (0.0132)
Close Election	-0.0429 (0.0533)	-0.00957 (0.0391)	-0.0162 (0.0341)	-0.00448 (0.0257)	0.00162 (0.0243)	0.00118 (0.0220)	-0.0110 (0.0202)	-0.0164 (0.0156)
Post × Close Election	0.151* (0.0787)	0.0882 (0.0572)	0.103** (0.0473)	0.0764* (0.0398)	0.0625* (0.0370)	0.0562* (0.0315)	0.0613** (0.0282)	0.0363** (0.0176)
Dep Var Mean	.562	.564	.563	.56	.559	.561	.562	.567
R <sup>2</sup>	.0243	.0176	.0161	.00944	.00538	.00417	.00347	.000837
N	267	483	853	1,227	1,603	1,996	2,444	4,627

*Notes.* Robust standard errors are clustered at the country of residence (CoR) level. Dependent variable is the emigrant turnout in country of origin (CoO) elections. The unit of observation is a CoO-CoR pair. Column titles indicate the number of days before and after the country of residence (CoR) election included in the particular window. The shortest is a 30-day window (i.e., 15 days before and after), while the longest is a 720-day window (i.e., 1 year before and after). \*\*\*,\*\* and \* denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.

TABLE XV  
TURNOUT AND LANGUAGE SIMILARITY

	15 days	30 days	60 days	90 days	120 days	150 days	180 days	360 days
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Post-Election	0.0715* (0.0403)	0.0669** (0.0304)	0.0628*** (0.0220)	0.0487** (0.0189)	0.0222 (0.0176)	0.0107 (0.0159)	0.0121 (0.0152)	0.00767 (0.0100)
Same Language	-0.0996 (0.0617)	-0.104** (0.0516)	-0.0851** (0.0382)	-0.0926*** (0.0310)	-0.0964*** (0.0289)	-0.119*** (0.0249)	-0.117*** (0.0225)	-0.0883*** (0.0207)
Post × Same Language	-0.166 (0.114)	-0.0458 (0.0859)	-0.0977 (0.0610)	-0.0936** (0.0455)	-0.0710* (0.0401)	0.00294 (0.0340)	0.00560 (0.0299)	-0.0330 (0.0236)
Dep Var Mean	.569	.57	.567	.562	.56	.56	.561	.566
R <sup>2</sup>	.0366	.0256	.0255	.0237	.0184	.0142	.0134	.0114
N	288	521	918	1,297	1,684	2,099	2,570	4,834

*Notes.* Robust standard errors are clustered at the country of residence (CoR) level. Dependent variable is the emigrant turnout in country of origin (CoO) elections. The unit of observation is a CoO-CoR pair. Column titles indicate the number of days before and after the country of residence (CoR) election included in the particular window. The shortest is a 30-day window (i.e., 15 days before and after), while the longest is a 720-day window (i.e., 1 year before and after). \*\*\*, \*\* and \* denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.



TABLE XVI  
EXCLUDING CONCURRENT ELECTIONS

	15 days	30 days	60 days	90 days	120 days	150 days	180 days	360 days
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Post-Election	0.0756* (0.0392)	0.0700** (0.0306)	0.0588*** (0.0205)	0.0430** (0.0183)	0.0160 (0.0170)	0.0116 (0.0149)	0.0118 (0.0142)	0.00369 (0.00909)
Dep Var Mean	.569	.57	.567	.563	.561	.56	.561	.567
R <sup>2</sup>	.0133	.0119	.0082	.00434	.000604	.000323	.000342	.000034
N	254	489	886	1,269	1,659	2,075	2,547	4,829

*Notes.* Robust standard errors are clustered at the country of residence (CoR) level. Dependent variable is the emigrant turnout in country of origin (CoO) elections. The unit of observation is a CoO-CoR pair. Column titles indicate the number of days before and after the country of residence (CoR) election included in the particular window. The shortest is a 30-day window (i.e., 15 days before and after), while the longest is a 720-day window (i.e., 1 year before and after). \*\*\*, \*\* and \* denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.

TABLE XVII  
CONCURRENT CoR ELECTIONS

	15 days	30 days	60 days	90 days	120 days	150 days	180 days	360 days
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Post-Election	0.0659 (0.0486)	0.0702** (0.0353)	0.0433* (0.0229)	0.0428** (0.0189)	0.0228 (0.0181)	0.0171 (0.0167)	0.0178 (0.0166)	-0.00489 (0.00981)
Concurrent	-0.0372 (0.0503)	-0.0235 (0.0386)	-0.0458 (0.0312)	-0.0173 (0.0256)	-0.00849 (0.0258)	-0.0142 (0.0241)	-0.0162 (0.0201)	-0.0587*** (0.0171)
Post × Concurrent	-0.00335 (0.0782)	-0.0147 (0.0643)	0.0539 (0.0411)	-0.00355 (0.0410)	-0.0270 (0.0356)	-0.0225 (0.0296)	-0.0243 (0.0272)	0.0304* (0.0180)
Dep Var Mean	.568	.569	.567	.563	.561	.56	.561	.567
R <sup>2</sup>	.0137	.0126	.00965	.00475	.00179	.0017	.0021	.0042
N	290	525	922	1,305	1,695	2,111	2,583	4,865

*Notes.* Robust standard errors are clustered at the country of residence (CoR) level. Dependent variable is the emigrant turnout in country of origin (CoO) elections. The unit of observation is a CoO-CoR pair. Column titles indicate the number of days before and after the country of residence (CoR) election included in the particular window. The shortest is a 30-day window (i.e., 15 days before and after), while the longest is a 720-day window (i.e., 1 year before and after). \*\*\*,\*\* and \* denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.

TABLE XVIII  
TURNOUT DUE TO DUAL CITIZENSHIP

	15 days	30 days	60 days	90 days	120 days	150 days	180 days	360 days
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Post-Election	0.0426 (0.0528)	0.0622 (0.0395)	0.0685** (0.0279)	0.0673*** (0.0229)	0.0411* (0.0211)	0.0332* (0.0188)	0.0380** (0.0167)	0.0109 (0.0106)
Dual	-0.0184 (0.0533)	-0.0210 (0.0433)	0.00734 (0.0327)	0.00739 (0.0265)	0.0203 (0.0248)	0.0265 (0.0241)	0.0273 (0.0216)	0.0100 (0.0184)
Post × Dual	0.0634 (0.0790)	0.0132 (0.0611)	-0.0250 (0.0440)	-0.0562 (0.0352)	-0.0575* (0.0333)	-0.0478 (0.0301)	-0.0583** (0.0275)	-0.0149 (0.0177)
Dep Var Mean	.57	.57	.568	.563	.561	.561	.561	.567
R <sup>2</sup>	.0148	.0121	.00817	.00696	.00271	.0017	.00242	.000198
N	289	524	920	1,303	1,691	2,107	2,579	4,857

*Notes.* Robust standard errors are clustered at the country of residence (CoR) level. Dependent variable is the emigrant turnout in country of origin (CoO) elections. The unit of observation is a CoO-CoR pair. Column titles indicate the number of days before and after the country of residence (CoR) election included in the particular window. The shortest is a 30-day window (i.e., 15 days before and after), while the longest is a 720-day window (i.e., 1 year before and after). \*\*\*,\*\* and \* denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.

TABLE XIX  
CoO & CoR TURNOUT

	15 days	30 days	60 days	90 days	120 days	150 days	180 days	360 days
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Post-Election	0.0498 (0.0582)	0.0832* (0.0422)	0.0891*** (0.0268)	0.0750*** (0.0242)	0.0257 (0.0212)	0.0156 (0.0190)	0.0111 (0.0194)	0.00409 (0.0130)
CoR Turnout	-0.000603 (0.0427)	-0.00295 (0.0318)	0.0129 (0.0264)	0.0438** (0.0214)	0.0137 (0.0193)	0.00594 (0.0175)	-0.00337 (0.0164)	-0.00411 (0.0153)
Post × CoR Turnout	0.0394 (0.0751)	-0.00812 (0.0576)	-0.0515 (0.0401)	-0.0646* (0.0349)	-0.0182 (0.0293)	-0.00852 (0.0253)	-0.000614 (0.0245)	-0.00170 (0.0188)
Dep Var Mean	.57	.573	.569	.564	.562	.562	.562	.566
R <sup>2</sup>	.0134	.0153	.0118	.00742	.000942	.000371	.000322	.0000921
N	278	504	888	1,249	1,620	2,017	2,468	4,643

*Notes.* Robust standard errors are clustered at the country of residence (CoR) level. Dependent variable is the emigrant turnout in country of origin (CoO) elections. The unit of observation is a CoO-CoR pair. Column titles indicate the number of days before and after the country of residence (CoR) election included in the particular window. The shortest is a 30-day window (i.e., 15 days before and after), while the longest is a 720-day window (i.e., 1 year before and after). \*\*\*,\*\* and \* denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.

TABLE XX  
CoO & RAIN IN CoR ELECTIONS

	15 days	30 days	60 days	90 days	120 days	150 days	180 days	360 days
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Post-Election	0.0996** (0.0435)	0.0838** (0.0333)	0.0797*** (0.0238)	0.0638*** (0.0208)	0.0314 (0.0198)	0.0260 (0.0166)	0.0270* (0.0161)	0.0139 (0.0107)
Precipitation	0.109* (0.0553)	0.0781* (0.0432)	0.0825** (0.0348)	0.0615** (0.0298)	0.0416* (0.0239)	0.0394* (0.0219)	0.0428** (0.0196)	0.0137 (0.0136)
Post × Precipitation	-0.124 (0.0795)	-0.0713 (0.0633)	-0.0860* (0.0516)	-0.0804* (0.0459)	-0.0614 (0.0408)	-0.0580 (0.0371)	-0.0623* (0.0345)	-0.0399** (0.0197)
Dep Var Mean	.568	.569	.568	.563	.562	.561	.562	.567
R <sup>2</sup>	.0226	.0167	.0143	.00815	.0025	.00202	.00235	.000864
N	290	525	921	1,303	1,692	2,108	2,579	4,860

*Notes.* Robust standard errors are clustered at the country of residence (CoR) level. Dependent variable is the emigrant turnout in country of origin (CoO) elections. The unit of observation is a CoO-CoR pair. Column titles indicate the number of days before and after the country of residence (CoR) election included in the particular window. The shortest is a 30-day window (i.e., 15 days before and after), while the longest is a 720-day window (i.e., 1 year before and after). \*\*\*,\*\* and \* denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.

TABLE XXI  
UNCERTAINTY

	Sample with Data				Same Ideology			
	15 days	30 days	60 days	90 days	15 days	30 days	60 days	90 days
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Post-Election	-0.0144 (0.0660)	-0.0177 (0.0538)	-0.00448 (0.0414)	-0.00992 (0.0354)	-0.0554 (0.0808)	-0.0519 (0.0646)	-0.0320 (0.0477)	-0.0187 (0.0434)
Close Election	-0.0497 (0.0567)	-0.0179 (0.0433)	-0.0184 (0.0372)	-0.00521 (0.0276)	-0.0461 (0.0712)	-0.0314 (0.0575)	-0.0297 (0.0456)	-0.00786 (0.0326)
Post × Close Election	0.142 (0.0870)	0.121* (0.0637)	0.107** (0.0523)	0.0900* (0.0456)	0.156 (0.107)	0.163** (0.0795)	0.146** (0.0626)	0.115** (0.0548)
Dep Var Mean	.573	.569	.571	.565	.562	.555	.572	.565
R <sup>2</sup>	.022	.0193	.0177	.0124	.0171	.024	.0222	.0175
N	233	423	746	1,076	176	307	559	804

*Notes.* Robust standard errors are clustered at the country of residence (CoR) level. Dependent variable is the emigrant turnout in country of origin (CoO) elections. The unit of observation is a CoO-CoR pair. Column titles indicate the number of days before and after the country of residence (CoR) election included in the particular window. The shortest is a 30-day window (i.e., 15 days before and after), while the longest is a 180-day window (i.e., 90 days before and after). The first four columns use the sample with available data on political ideology, while the last four columns limit this sample to elections competed by candidates or parties with the same ideology. \*\*\*, \*\* and \* denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.

TABLE XXII  
LOCAL ELECTIONS

	15 days	30 days	60 days	90 days	120 days	150 days	180 days	360 days
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Post-Election	-0.00392 (0.0526)	-0.0208 (0.0420)	-0.00994 (0.0304)	-0.00246 (0.0253)	-0.00902 (0.0247)	-0.0186 (0.0211)	-0.0247 (0.0190)	-0.0115 (0.0103)
Dep Var Mean	.591	.561	.566	.557	.563	.562	.561	.563
R <sup>2</sup>	.0000382	.00107	.000246	.0000147	.000194	.000835	.00152	.00032
N	178	291	527	675	824	1,076	1,333	2,613

*Notes.* Robust standard errors are clustered at the country of residence (CoR) level. Dependent variable is the emigrant turnout in country of origin (CoO) elections. The unit of observation is a CoO-CoR pair. Column titles indicate the number of days before and after the country of residence (CoR) election included in the particular window. The shortest is a 30-day window (i.e., 15 days before and after), while the longest is a 720-day window (i.e., 1 year before and after). \*\*\*, \*\* and \* denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.

TABLE XXIII  
CONFLICT EVENTS (HIGH IN COUNTS)

	15 days	30 days	60 days	90 days	120 days	150 days	180 days	360 days
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Post-Conflict	-0.0286 (0.0450)	-0.0400 (0.0309)	-0.0143 (0.0251)	-0.0263 (0.0208)	-0.0408** (0.0185)	-0.0333* (0.0173)	-0.0335** (0.0168)	-0.0108 (0.00732)
Dep Var Mean	.495	.503	.509	.508	.504	.512	.518	.529
R <sup>2</sup>	.00189	.0038	.000484	.00164	.00383	.0025	.00248	.000261
N	201	362	701	1,038	1,394	1,738	2,035	3,545

*Notes.* Robust standard errors are clustered at the country of residence (CoR) level. Dependent variable is the emigrant turnout in country of origin (CoO) elections. The unit of observation is a CoO-CoR pair. Column titles indicate the number of days before and after the country of residence (CoR) election included in the particular window. The shortest is a 30-day window (i.e., 15 days before and after), while the longest is a 720-day window (i.e., 1 year before and after). \*\*\*,\*\* and \* denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.



TABLE XXIV  
CONFLICTS EVENTS (HIGH IN FATALITIES)

	15 days	30 days	60 days	90 days	120 days	150 days	180 days	360 days
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Post-Conflict	0.0765 (0.0487)	0.0573 (0.0415)	0.0432 (0.0282)	0.0284 (0.0229)	0.0287 (0.0190)	0.0162 (0.0192)	0.0208 (0.0157)	-0.00382 (0.00686)
Dep Var Mean	.486	.481	.501	.505	.503	.507	.514	.521
R <sup>2</sup>	.015	.00751	.00423	.00176	.00184	.000581	.000965	.0000322
N	162	300	577	912	1,209	1,480	1,748	3,082

*Notes.* Robust standard errors are clustered at the country of residence (CoR) level. Dependent variable is the emigrant turnout in country of origin (CoO) elections. The unit of observation is a CoO-CoR pair. Column titles indicate the number of days before and after the country of residence (CoR) election included in the particular window. The shortest is a 30-day window (i.e., 15 days before and after), while the longest is a 720-day window (i.e., 1 year before and after). \*\*\*, \*\* and \* denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.

## FIGURES





FIGURE I  
Dataset Coverage

*Note:* The red shade indicates that the country is both a (migrant-sending) CoO and (migrant-receiving) CoR, while the blue shade indicates that the country is listed as a CoR in a CoO election.



(a) Spanish Elections (irregular)

(b) US Elections (regular)

FIGURE II

Electoral Calendar

*Note:* For each figure, the subplots represent a country of origin (CoO) whose migrants reside in either Spain or the US. The  $x$ -axis is the number of days to/from the country of residence (CoR) election, i.e., Spanish or US elections. The red dashed line signifies the day of the CoR election. The  $y$ -axis represents the year. The ISO country code is plotted to indicate the date of the CoO election, relative to the CoR election.




FIGURE III

Event Study of CoO Turnout by Month from CoR Election

*Note:* The dependent variable is turnout in country of origin (CoO) elections. The horizontal axis ranges from 6 months before to 6 months after the country of residence (CoR) election. The vertical red dashed line signifies the day of the CoR election. The gray square is the coefficient estimate, with the thick gray bar showing the 90% confidence interval and the thin gray bar showing the 95% confidence interval.




FIGURE IV  
Election Window by Week

*Note:* The dependent variable is turnout in country of origin (CoO) elections and the independent variable is the  $Post_{ort}$  dummy which equals 1 if the CoO election comes after the country of residence (CoR) election, and 0 otherwise. The horizontal axis ranges from 7 to 720 days after the CoR election. The square is the coefficient estimate, with the thick bar showing the 90% confidence interval and the thin bar showing the 95% confidence interval. The gray bars are the interval estimates for each week until the end of the 720-day window. The blue bars are the pre-selected windows in our results tables.




FIGURE V  
Removing Countries

*Note:* The dependent variable is turnout in country of origin (CoO) elections and the independent variable is the  $Post_{ort}$  dummy which equals 1 if the CoO election comes after the country of residence (CoR) election, and 0 otherwise. The CoOs and CoRs being dropped from the sample are listed along the horizontal axis. The gray square is the coefficient estimate that results after dropping the chosen country, with the thick gray bar showing the 90% confidence interval and the thin gray bar showing the 95% confidence interval. The 60-day window is used to obtain these estimates.




FIGURE VI  
Election Window by Week (Placebo)

*Note:* The dependent variable is turnout in country of origin (CoO) elections and the independent variable is the  $Post_{ort}$  dummy which equals 1 if the CoO election comes after the country of residence (CoR) election, and 0 otherwise. The horizontal axis ranges from 7 to 720 days after the CoR election. The square is the coefficient estimate, with the thick bar showing the 90% confidence interval and the thin bar showing the 95% confidence interval. The gray bars are the interval estimates for each week until the end of the 720-day window. The blue bars are the pre-selected windows in our results tables.




FIGURE VII

Google Trends 'Interest over Time' Index

*Note:* The dependent variable is the Google 'Interest over Time' Index. The horizontal axis ranges from 30 days before to 30 days after the country of residence (CoR) election. The vertical red dashed line signifies the day of the CoR election. The blue (gray) square is the coefficient estimate for observations whose CoO election occurs after (before) the CoR election, with the thick blue (gray) bar showing the corresponding 90% confidence interval and the thin blue (gray) bar showing the corresponding 95% confidence interval.